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Introduction
Spontaneous reporting systems are used worldwide as a means of collecting information on adverse drug reac-
tions and events.1 Although the systems vary, they generally solicit reports from medical health practitioners
of serious or unexpected medical reactions that may have been caused by a medication. The compilation
of reports allows organizations like the Food and Drug Administration to see common reactions or unusual
patterns of activity around certain medications, thereby indicating that heightened precaution or further
study may be desirable. Despite thorough pre-market testing, spontaneous reporting systems are valuable
because clinical trials only test small sample sizes and do not test combinations of medications or products.
Additionally, individual variability in drug metabolism can lead to very dierent patient responses to med-
1The term \adverse drug reaction" has been dened dierently by dierent sources but it generally de-
scribes a response to a medicine that is unexpected, unintended, undesired or excessive. Technically the
term \adverse drug events" (\ADEs") \encompasses both medication errors and `adverse drug reactions."'
(\ADRs") Jerry Phillips, RPh, FDA Eorts at Minimizing the Risks of Preventable Adverse Drug Events,
http://www.medscape.com/medscape/pharmacists/journal/2000/v01.n04/mph7174.phil/mph7174.phil-01.html (posted July
1, 2000) (last accessed April 6, 2001). The literature about spontaneous reporting often seems to omit express acknowledgement
of this distinction. The Food and Drug Administration in the United States requests reports of adverse drug events, while most
other spontaneous reporting systems worldwide request reports of adverse drug reactions. For the purpose of this article, the
term \adverse drug event" will be used whenever a reference denoted data as adverse drug event information, in the description
of U.S. policy, and in discussions relating to both medication errors and adverse drug reactions. The term \adverse drug
reaction" will be used in the description of all other foreign data and discussions unrelated to medication errors.
1ications. Therefore, continued monitoring of these products is necessary to ensure public safety.2;3 There
is little doubt that doctors and other health care professionals are uniquely situated to receive and report
this information.4 Although countries around the world rely on spontaneous reporting systems as safety
indicators, reporting rates by health care professionals are dismal, usually in single digit percentages.
The purpose of this article is to highlight and analyze possible improvements to spontaneous reporting sys-
tems, in particular, and drug safety, in general. Part I of this article will provide a background on adverse
drug reactions and spontaneous reporting systems, with particular emphasis on the MedWatch reporting
system currently used in the United States. Part II will discuss physician attitudinal studies performed
worldwide that have attempted to highlight the reasons for the underreporting of adverse reactions and
problems with reporting systems. Part III will analyze problems identied with spontaneous reporting sys-
tems and potential improvements of them.
2See also Laurence Landow, M.D., Monitoring Adverse Drug Events: The Food and Drug Administration MedWatch
Reporting System, 23 Reg'l Anesthesia & Pain Med. 190, 191 (1998) (51% of approved drugs are associated with adverse
eects not detected before approval).
3It is important to note that FDA \does not require that postmarketing studies routinely be performed to determine the rates
of ADEs." Rebecca S. Gruchalla, M.D., Ph.D., A One-year Perspective on MedWatch: The Food and Drug Administration's
new medical products reporting program, 95 J. Allergy & Clinical Immunology 1153, 1153 (1995).
4See Peter H. Rheinstein, MD, MS, MedWatch: The FDA Medical Products Reporting Program, 48 Am. Fam. Physician
636, 638 (1993); cf. David A. Kessler, MD Introducing MedWatch A New Approach to Reporting Medication and Device
Adverse Events and Product Problems, 269 JAMA 2765, 2765 (1993); see also Mary Pat Couig & Ruth B. Merkatz, MedWatch:
the New Medical Products Reporting Program, 93 Am. J. Nursing 65, 66 (\Because nurses are the largest group of health
professionals and have more constant, direct contact with patients in the hospital, home, and in ambulatory care settings than
any other group, nurses are in a unique position to identify and report adverse eects of drugs, biologics, medical devices, and
special nutritional products such as medical foods.").
2I.
Background on Adverse Drug Reactions and Reporting
The incidence of adverse drug events and reactions is amazing. Adverse drug events are estimated to account
for about 106,000 deaths in the United States each year, more than auto accidents, suicides, and homicides
combined,5 making adverse eects of drugs one of the top six causes of death in this country.6 One study
found that between 3 and 11% of hospital admissions could be attributed to adverse drug reactions.7 Other
studies have reported that between 10 and 20% of all hospitalized patients will experience adverse drug
events while in the hospital.8 Drug-related morbidity and mortality costs in the billions of dollars annually
in the United States.9
This section will rst discuss the causes of adverse drug events and mechanisms for reducing their frequency.
It will then provide a general background on reporting systems and specic details about the Food and Drug
Administration's MedWatch system.
5See Landow, supra note 2, at 190.
6See Alastair J.J. Wood, MD et al., Making Medicines Safer { The need for an Independent Drug Safety Board, 339 New
Eng. J. Med. 1851, 1852 (1998).
7See Kessler, supra note 4, at 2765.
8See Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients; Preemption of Disclosure Rules, 59 Fed. Reg.
3944, 3945 (1994).
9See Charles Marwick, MedGuide: At Last a Long-Sought Opportunity for Patient Education about Prescription Drugs, 277
JAMA 949, 949 (1997); see also, Michael A. Friedman, MD et al., The Safety of Newly Approved Medicines: Do Recent Market
Removals Mean There is a Problem?, 281 JAMA 1728, 1732 (1999) (\Expected toxic eects from marketed drugs, even when
used appropriately, is estimated to rank among the top 10 causes of death in the United States and is estimated to cost more
that $30 billion annually.").
3A.
What causes adverse drug events?
Allergic reactions and combinations of incompatible medications often cause adverse drug events. These
occur because of our inability to know everything about a drug and its potential eects before it is mar-
keted. However, some adverse drug events are caused, or at least perpetuated, by human practices. These
include patient non-compliance with medication recommendations, mistakes and administrative errors. With
increased attention, both of these types of drug events could be minimized.
Adverse reactions are commonly caused by allergic reactions to medications and interactions between mul-
tiple medications. Any given medication will cause allergies in some proportion of patients, and often the
allergies will not be foreseeable prior to use of the drug. Interactions between multiple medications are often
not determined in the pre-market phase of drug testing, so they too can cause ADRs in patients taking
more than one drug. Although these complications seem unpreventable, there are ways to minimize their
occurrence. Focusing attention and study on particular groups who suer more frequently from drug allergies
and medication interactions could reduce their prevalence.
Gender and age dierences create distinct adverse events and complicate a doctor's ability to diagnose
problems. A 1994 article in the Journal of Adolescent Health stressed the importance of focusing on
adverse events occurring in adolescents.10 The FDA has no policy encouraging testing on adolescents as it
does on pediatric, geriatric and gender groups, thus post-marketing studies are particularly important for
10Stuart L. Nightingale, M.D. & Freddie Ann Homan, M.D., MedWatch and Adolescence, J. Adolescent Health 279
(1994).
4the adolescent group.11 Adolescents have reactions that are particularly hard to predict because
metabolic and hormonal alterations may confound the eects of drugs and other products
used during this time period. Because the changes do not occur all at once and may vary
from individual to individual the special needs of adolescents may be dicult to ascertain as a
population, and the adverse eects of drug and device products can easily go unrecognized.12
Even when used correctly, there exists the potential for interaction between, for example, medications and
the teenager's changing hormonal balance.13 However, monitoring teenagers to learn about their adverse
events is quite dicult since they seek autonomy and independence in taking medications.14 One further
diculty, as the article suggested, is that teens are also likely to misuse medications and not follow labels
causing a dierent set of ADEs.15Among other things, this means that before doctors or pharmacists report
adverse events from teenagers, they should verify that their patient used the medication correctly. Overall,
awareness of and attention to the increased medication risks for adolescents could be helpful in dealing with
these problems.
Other groups also face an increased risk of adverse drug events. Wrong doses often create adverse reactions in
children.16 Surprisingly, it is not clear whether the elderly are particularly at risk. An article in the Archives
of Internal Medicine in 1991 discussing adverse drug reactions concluded that when analyzed per drug
exposure, reaction rates for the elderly were not higher than for younger groups.17 Nevertheless, the United
Kingdom's Committee on Safety of Medicines (\CSM") has included adverse reactions in children and the
elderly among their \areas of particular interest" for monitoring.18 The same 1991 study found that across
11See id. at 279.
13See id. at 280.
14See id.
15Id. at 280.
16See Institute of Medicine Report: To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, p.28, November 29, 1999, available at http://bob.nap.edu/html/to err is human/. (last accessed April 9, 2001).
17Gerald A. Faich, MD, MPH, National Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, 151 Archives Internal Med. 1645, 1646 (1991).
18Committee on Safety of Medicines web page, accessible through http://www.open.gov.uk (last accessed April 6, 2001). The
other \particular interests" are delayed drug eects (long term eects), congenital anomalies (they might be adverse reactions
5all age groups about 60% of adverse drug reaction reports involved females.19 In general, it seems that
certain gender and age qualities may be risk factors for medication problems.
It is clear that under-informed patients cause a large portion of adverse drug events.20 Patient compliance
with medication is dicult to determine.21 It is estimated that between 30-55% of patients do not follow
prescribed drug regimens, largely due to lack of information,22 and some have estimated that compliance
with long-term self-administered medication treatments is only about 50 percent.23 Initially, this creates
diculties for physicians who try to distinguish between non-compliance and lack of therapeutic ecacy.
In addition, failures to follow prescribed regimens result in therapeutic failures and adverse drug events.
For example, skipping doses and then trying to make them up by taking multiple doses over a condensed
period of time can result in ADEs. Also, failing to take a drug according to instruction could result in it
being ineectual and a new drug being prescribed, causing an unnecessary increase in adverse event risk.
Since drug-related morbidity and mortality costs are in the billions, plans for getting more information to
patients have been mandated. However, there is no way to monitor these eorts to see if they are eective
and no way to enforce them. Currently, patients receive information largely in the form of printouts given
with prescription medications. While this creates more patient awareness, some members of the medical
community believe that these pamphlets place too much emphasis on the dangers of medications and not
enough information on their benets. Doctors are also concerned about pharmacists playing too big a role
to some medication used prior to birth) and herbal remedies (they may cause ADRs). Id.
19Faich, 151 Archives Internal Med. at 1645-46, supra note 17.
20See Marwick, supra note 9, at 949.
21See Barbara J. Stephenson, RN et al., Is the Patient Taking the Treatment as Prescribed?, 269 JAMA 2779, 2780 (1993).
22See Justina A. Molzon, The FDA's Perspective on the Future of Pharmacy, Address at the Drake University Law School
and College of Pharmacy Symposium on The Evolving Pharmacy Jurisprudence (April 9, 1994), in, 44 Drake L. Rev. 463,
465-66 (1996).
23See Stephenson et al., supra note 21, at 2779.
6in providing medical information, especially verbally.24 The FDA itself has emphasized the importance of
informing patients and eliminating the gap between \what patients need to know about their drugs, and
what they actually learn about them from their physician and pharmacist."25
Other studies have shown that many adverse drug events are caused by administrative errors or mistakes
and therefore can be prevented. The magnitude of these errors was discussed by the Institute of Medicine,
which published a lengthy report on the subject in 1999, including recommendations on how to improve
patient safety overall and reduce medical errors.26 In an eort to reduce mistakes of this kind, a study in
the Journal of the American Medical Association tested the ecacy of a computer alert system in
identifying potential ADEs.27 It stated that 28-56% of ADEs are preventable, and that these are mostly
caused by errors in order writing, present in up to 5% of all prescriptions.28 Other times wrong doses or
wrong medications are prescribed, due to lack of information about the drug or patient.29 Computer systems
can reduce errors by eciently cross-checking new medications with existing patient records. The computer
system used in the study reduced adverse drug event injuries at a rate of 64 per 1000 patient admissions
in this way.30 It is clear that the implementation of a computerized system and other error prevention
mechanisms should be seriously considered by health organizations.
24See Marwick, supra note 9, at 949.
25Molzon, supra note 22, at 466.
26Institute of Medicine Report, supra note 16.
27Robert A. Rasche, MD, MS et al, A Computer Alert System to Prevent Injury from Adverse Drug Events, 280 JAMA 1317
(1998).
28Id. at 1317.
29See id.
30Id. at 1317, 1319.
7B.
Background on reporting systems
1.
Generally
Spontaneous reporting systems worldwide have similar processes for acquiring and handling ADR informa-
tion. A local or national agency is responsible for accumulating ADR data from medical professionals. When
medical professionals encounter ADRs they are either required or requested to ll out a form describing the
event and the conditions leading up to it. This can usually be sent directly to the agency responsible or
to the drug manufacturer. Often the drug companies are required to forward copies of their forms to the
central agency. The agency compiles the information, looking for suspicious trends that may represent drug
reactions. At that point the agency can take preventative measure such as adding warnings to the product
labeling or in the extreme case, recalling the product. Therefore, increasing the frequency of ADR reporting
will often accelerate the agency's ability to notice reaction patterns and will allow it to take preventative
measures more quickly.
Reporting rates of spontaneous reporting systems worldwide, both voluntary and mandatory, are extremely
low. Even in the United Kingdom, the leader in this eld, only about 10% of adverse drug events are re-
ported.31 It is estimated that in the United States in the mid-1980's only 1% of adverse drug events were
reported, with the number rising to 5.2% in 1994 following changes to the reporting system.32
31See Landow, supra note 2, at 192.
32See id. See generally Stephen A. Goldman, MD, Dianne L. Kennedy, RPh, MPH, MedWatch: FDA's Medical products
reporting program, 103 Postgraduate Med. 13, 13 (1998) (discussing a study where not one of the physicians contacted had
ever reported an ADR despite having clinically observed serious ADRs).
8It is noteworthy that until they take preventative measures, agencies and companies do not usually provide
access to their information and data, to the chagrin of some physicians who desire immediate access.33 A
1994 letter in the Journal of the American Medical Association (\JAMA") questioned the FDA's
practice of not providing medical professionals with access to the data.34 The doctors who wrote in explained
that while physicians are expected to report information, they are not given access to the data unless they pay
hundreds of dollars for printouts on a single drug.35 A response by FDA doctor Stuart Nightingale explained
that the FDA does not provide information about problems with medications or products until causality has
been established, at which point Dear Health Professional Letters and the FDA Medical Bulletin are means
of distributing updates.36
Dr. Nightingale identied some of the problems with an open access system. To begin with, in any given
ADE case associations between the medication and the adverse event may or may not be established. Fur-
thermore, it is unclear how many unreported instances of adverse events occur and how many people are
taking the medication, so one cannot assess the frequency of ADEs. Another response to the JAMA letter,
by Dr. John D. Siegfried, explained that drug event reports are often incomplete, do not provide follow up
information, and are usually further complicated by the parallel use of other medications and the eects of
other diseases.37 He emphasized that the database is not intended as a case management tool and cannot be
33See Cheryl L. Vogt, PharmD & Patricia J. Byrns, MD, Adverse Drug Reactions: Getting Information Back from Med-
Watch, 272 JAMA 590, 590 (1994); W.H.W. Inman, Attitudes to Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, 41 Brit. J. Clinical
Pharmacology, 434, 434 (1996) (regarding similar complaints about the British spontaneous reporting system).
34Vogt & Byrns, supra note 33, at 590.
35Id.
36Stuart L. Nightingale, MD, In reply: Adverse Drug Reactions: Getting Information Back from MedWatch, 272 JAMA
590, 591 (1994).
37John D. Siegfried, MD, In reply: Adverse Drug Reactions: Getting Information Back from MedWatch, 272 JAMA 590,
591 (1994).
9used for that purpose.38 The data would not be useful from an epidemiological perspective, since reported
adverse events are its only mechanisms for detecting the potential of developing a problem. These limitations
on adverse event reporting data and the likelihood of misuse of that data may explain why the FDA, as well
as pharmaceutical companies, generally refrain from distributing the data they collect.
2.
The current state of United State's system
In an attempt to improve its reporting system, the United States introduced its newly named \MedWatch"39
system in June 1993 while Dr. David Kessler was Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. At
the same time, Dr. Kessler published a letter in the Journal of the American Medical Association
explaining the need for an improved post-market reporting system and highlighting the changes made to
create MedWatch.40 Dr. Kessler cited to a then-current study saying that only 1% of serious adverse events
were reported to FDA.41 He contended that there were multiple reasons for underreporting by physicians. To
38Id. Dr. Siegfried's explanation is similar to that of Dr. Gerald Faich, the former FDA Director of Epidemiology and
Biostatistics Center for Drugs and Biologics:
[O]ne or even many reports of adverse reactions often do not provide sucient information to conrm that a drug caused
the reaction. A reaction may be caused by the suspect drug, another drug that a patient is taking, or the underlying diseases
for which the drug was prescribed; it may also be entirely coincidental. Thus, adversereaction monitoring should be viewed
primarily as a means for identifying potential problems.
(citations omitted) Gerald A. Faich, MD, MPH, Special Report: Adverse-Drug-Reaction Monitoring, 314 New Eng. J. Med.
1589, 1591 (1986).
See also, Richard I. Shader, MD, David J. Greenblatt, MD, MedWatch, the New FDA Averse Eects Reporting System, 13 J.
of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 303, 303-04 (1993) (\The system is intended to provide and initial signal on the possible
association of a drug (or device) with an unusual, unexpected or serious adverse event. The signal by itself is not conclusive
and does not prove cause and eect. Any implied association must be followed by further study using appropriately rigorous
experimental, clinical, or epidemiologic methods.") (emphasis in original).
39Although this name was rst used in 1993, the United States had a spontaneous reporting system prior to MedWatch.
40Kessler, supra note 4.
41Id. at 2765 (citing H.D. Scott, S.E. Rosenbaum et al., Rhode Island physicians' recognition and reporting of adverse drug
10begin with, doctors may not link the unexpected outcome of treatment with the drug or device but instead
think the reaction is related to the disease itself. He conceded that this is largely due to limited medical
training in pharmacology and therapeutics.42 Second, notication of these problems to the FDA was not yet
ingrained in medical professionals in the United States, as it was in the United Kingdom.43 Third, too much
paperwork was making reporting tedious. Finally, he asserted that doctors were unclear on what should and
should not be reported.44
The MedWatch system was set up to alleviate these problems. MedWatch functions on mandatory reporting
from manufacturers and voluntary reporting from physicians.45 The reporting process has been reduced to
a one-page form that is identical for each type of FDA-regulated product (except vaccines which are treated
separately). Physicians have the option of reporting directly to the FDA or to drug manufacturers, who
are required to forward the reports to the FDA. In 1996, 9.0% of the reports were submitted directly to
FDA, while manufacturers submitted 91% of the reports to FDA. Reports sent in by the manufacturers
that described events not included in the ocial FDA literature for medications, known as 15-day reports,
accounted for 15.6% of the total.46 In his letter, Dr. Kessler expressly noted that physicians should not
reactions, 70 R.I. Med. J. 311 (1987)); see also David W. Bates, MD, MSc. et al., Relationship between Medication Errors
and Adverse Drug Events, 10 J Gen Internal Med 199, 199 (1995) (\[S]pontaneous reporting, the usual means of ADE
identication, overlooks as many as 95-99% of ADE's that are detectable by other methods.").
42Kessler, supra note 4, at 2765. See generally David W. Nierenberg, MD, Clinical Pharmacology Instruction for all Med-
ical Students, 40 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 483 (1986) (discussing the need for more emphasis on clinical
pharmacology in medical school).
43Kessler, supra note 4, at 2765.
44Id. at 2765, 2767.
45\Reporting of postmarket ADEs by health professionals and consumers is voluntary. They may send their reports directly to
FDA, to the manufacturer or both. Drug manufacturers are required by law and regulation to submit to FDA postmarket ADR
reports received by any means from health professional or consumers." http://www.fda.gov/cder/dpe/annrep96/index.htm
(last accessed April 6, 2001).
\There are three types of reports in the FDA computerized postmarket ADE database: 1. Manufacturer-reported cases
concerning ADEs not in present ocial FDA labeling with serious outcomes (i.e., death, life-threatening, hospitalization,
permanent disability, congenital anomaly, cancer, or overdose). These cases are known in regulatory language as \15-day Alert
Reports" because the manufacturer has 15 working days to submit this type of report to FDA. 2. All other manufacturer-
reported cases. These cases are known in regulatory languages as \Periodic Reports" because the manufacturer is required to
submit them to FDA on a cyclical basis. 3. Cases sent directly to FDA by health professionals or consumers (\Direct Reports").
Id.
46http://www.fda.gov/cder/dpe/annrep96/index.htm (last accessed April 6, 2001).
11report every adverse event observed due to the impracticality for the doctors and the FDA. Instead, only
serious events should be reported: those related to death, a life threatening condition, initial or prolonged
hospitalization, disability, congenital anomaly, or when intervention is required to prevent permanent im-
pairment or damage.47 In addition, Dr. Kessler explained that doctors should report a problem even if
they are only suspicious of a link between a regulated product and a serious event. He emphasized that
there need not be a denite connection, and that they do not have to wait for compelling evidence. Upon
encountering a suspicious data set, the FDA's options include: issuing warnings, making labeling changes,
requiring manufacturers to conduct post-marketing studies, and ordering product withdrawals. In 1993, the
FDA launched a large-scale advertising eort to inform physicians of MedWatch, its procedures and the
benets of reporting.
MedWatch does not verify or validate reaction reports to determine whether or not they actually occurred or
could plausibly have been caused by the drug or device.48This would require signicant resource expenditure.
There has not been much discussion in the literature of inaccurate reports, although one can imagine a sit-
uation where someone who has a grudge against a certain company would attempt to sabotage their product.
47Kessler, supra note 4, at 2768.
Later articles, authored in part by MedWatch director Dianne Kennedy, restrict reporting to events that are serious and
unexpected, unexpected meaning not currently in the ocial labeling for the drug. See Goldman, supra note 32, at 14; Toni
D. Piazza-Hepp & Dianne L. Kennedy, Reporting of Adverse Events to MedWatch, 52 Am. J. Health-Sys. Pharmacy 1436,
1439 (\Reporting well-known adverse reactions to older drugs to FDA is generally not encouraged unless there is suspicion
of a generic drug product inequivalency, other product problem, previously unknown drug interaction, or some other unusual
circumstance. MedWatch data are not used to calculate the frequency of particular adverse events in clinical practice but rather
to signal safety concerns and generate appropriate responses.").
48See Shader, supra note 38, at 304.
12II.
Attitudinal Studies on Underreporting by Physicians
Several attitudinal studies from around the world are presented in Table 1, Appendix A for use in this dis-
cussion. The compilation highlights issues central to medical practitioners when deciding whether to report
adverse reactions. Since the studies in Table 1 will be used demonstratively throughout the article, this
section will briey summarize each study and will conclude with a discussion of their limitations.
A.
Compilation of attitudinal studies
1.
Background on the European Union study49
A study conducted in 1993-94 attempted to compare doctors' attitudes to adverse reaction reporting systems
in European Union countries.50 The same questionnaire, with a few variations for individual countries,51
was sent to doctors in Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.52 The authors indicated that over-interpretation of the results would not be advisable due
49K. J. Belton & The European Pharmacovigilance Research Group, Attitude Survey of Adverse Drug-Reaction Reporting
by Health Care Professionals Across the European Union, 52 Eur. J. Clinical Pharmacology 423 (1997).
50Id. at 424.
51Id. at 425.
52Id. at 423.
13to potentially disproportionate sample sizes and over-representation of some types of medical professionals
in parts of the studies.53 It is noteworthy that while Portugal actually requests that all ADRs be reported,
Ireland, Holland, Spain and the United Kingdom request reports only for serious reactions and reactions to
new drugs.54
2.
Background on the Northern Italian study55
In 1997 a study was published in Pharmacological Research detailing attitudes toward adverse drug
reaction reporting by medical practitioners in a district in northern Italy.56 This study attempted to deter-
mine why doctors were underreporting reactions. In Italy, a structured national reporting scheme has not yet
been fully established. Italian law requires doctors to notify the Area Health Authorities of suspected ADRs,
and those agencies are required to send the reports to the Ministry of Health. Imbalances between districts
in the Italian system suggest that it does not function eciently. Nearly 40% of the total ADRs reported
in 1994 came from regions whose populations comprised only 17% of Italy's total population. In 1994 the
area studied in this article, Varese, Italy, had over 300,000 inhabitants but only 3 ADR reports, a very low
number. Regardless, reporting rates for all of Italy are not particularly impressive. In 1992 only 75 reports
53Id. at 426.
54Id. at 427; Karen J. Belton et al., Attitudinal Survey of Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting by Medical Practitioners in the
United Kingdom, 39 Br. J. Clinical Pharmacology 223, 225 (1995).
The UK's Committee on Safety of Medicines also specically wants not only proven ADRs but also suspected ones. Id. at 226.
55Marco Cosentino, et al., Attitudes to Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting by Medical Practitioners in a Northern Italian
District, 35 Pharmacological Research 85 (1997).
56Id. at 85.
14per million inhabitants were sent from Italy to the World Health Organization Collaborating Center. As a
basis for comparison, the corresponding rates for Denmark and Germany were 429 and 407, respectively.57
3.
Background on the Irish study58
A 1999 study of Irish doctors focused on the relationship between their attitudes and underreporting. This
survey included both general practitioners and hospital doctors, but separated the data for comparison pur-
poses. Overall, however, there was little dierence between the responses of the general practitioners and
the hospital-based doctors. It is worth noting that unlike the MedWatch system, the Irish Medicines Board
requests reports on all ADRs.59
4.
Background on the Dutch study60
57Id.
58D. Williams & J. Feely, Underreporting of Adverse Drug Reactions: Attitudes of Irish Doctors, 168 Irish J. Med. Sci. 257
(1999).
59Id. at 259.
60I. A. Eland et al., Attitudinal Survey of Voluntary Reporting of Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 Brit. J. Clinical Pharmacology
623 (1999).
15A Dutch survey published in 1999 endeavored to determine reporting attitudes by ascertaining past behavior,
questioning participants about whether they would report hypothetical medical reactions, and comparing
the answers of dierent types of doctors.61 In accordance with predicted rates of adverse reactions, 98% of
the entire group of respondents had diagnosed an ADR in one of their patients.62 Overall those participants
who had previously reported an ADR were more inclined to report the hypothetical ones.63
5.
Background on the Northern Region of the United Kingdom study64
In 1992, a British survey was published which tried to compare attitudinal dierences between medical
communities with high and low reporting rates.65 As the South African study, infra, mentioned, 80% of
the ADRs in the United Kingdom are submitted by 7.4% of its doctors.66 The Irish article also provided
some information about United Kingdom reporting rates. It is estimated that in the UK, which has utilized
the \Yellow Card" system for reporting adverse drug reactions to the Committee on Safety of Medicines
since 1964, only 10-15% of severe reactions are reported.67 The CSM solicits serious suspected ADRs from
established drugs and all suspected ADRs from new drugs.68
61Id. at 624.
62Id.
63Id.at 625.
64D. N. Bateman, et al., Attitudes to Adverse drug reaction reporting in the Northern Region, 34 Brit. J. Clinical Pharma-
cology 421 (1992).
65Id. at 421.
66See Ashley H. Robins, M.D., D.P.M., M.R.C. PSYCH. et al., Attitudes to Adverse Drug Reactions and their Reporting
Among Medical Practitioners, 72 S. Afr. Med. J. 131, 134 (1987).
67See Williams, supra note 58, at 259.
68See Bateman, supra note 64, at 425.
16The study proposed various statements to the participants and had them respond in agreement or disagree-
ment. Personal liability concerns ranged from 9-20% of those surveyed. Interestingly, between 26-30% of
the general practitioners felt that they should be nancially reimbursed. The corresponding numbers for
consultants and junior hospital doctors were much lower, at 8-14% and 8-23% respectively. The lower gures
in each set represented responses from the \high" reporting districts.69 The data on nancial reimbursement
is hard to compare with other studies since none of the others directly solicited this information.
Overall, the study's authors seemed to think that education might improve reporting rates.70 They felt that
the attitudes that surfaced in the study showed that the doctors were clearly aware of the system but lacked
the requisite knowledge to \contribute to it optimally."71
6.
Background on the South African study72
This study focused on private practitioners in the Cape Town region of South Africa and analyzed the report-
ing habits of general practitioners, medical specialists and surgical specialists.73 Their reporting practices
were of concern because 97% of the doctors in the Cape Town region did not report a single ADR within the
course of a year.74 The authors concluded that few doctors regarded reporting as part of handling ADRs in
their practice.75
69Id. at 426.
70Id.
71Id.
72Robins, supra note 66.
73Id. at 131.
74Id. at 134.
75Id. at 131, 133.
17The South African study concluded that there was signicant doubt as to whether further attempts to incul-
cate positive attitudes would substantially improve motivation to report adverse reactions.76 The authors
did not clearly explain why this was their conclusion, except to imply that mandatory reporting would not
solve the problem.
B.
Limitations of these studies
Although the studies assessing the reasons for underreporting may be useful for maximizing drug reaction
information, it is not clear that they accurately represent the reasons for underreporting in the United States
and elsewhere. Since they were not performed in the United States, they may reect attitudinal dierences
that result from variations in each country's individual spontaneous reporting system. Additionally, many
health care professionals may not be aware of the extent some factors inuence their decision not to report.
Without a specic question to trigger the respondent's thought process, these unapparent factors may not
emerge. One can speculate that the results in the studies are largely correlated to the questions asked. For
example, a potentially critical background factor such as the reporting attitudes in the health professional's
working environment may be unapparent to the survey respondent. Yet no study asked how many physicians
knew other physicians who had ever reported ADRs. None asked how many were armatively encouraged
by anyone in their oce to report. None asked whether any patient had ever asked them to report an ADR
and how it would have aected them if they had been asked. Although these questions were not asked, they
represent factors that may still be quite relevant to underreporting, but for which there is little statistical
76Id. at 134.
18support. The essential point is that these studies should not be regarded as the nal word on explanations
for underreporting or possible solutions to the problem. A nal limitation of the studies regards the response
rates. The response rates for the surveys ranged from 19.7%77 (the Spain portion of the EU survey) to 77%78
(the Sweden portion of the EU survey), with second place going to the Northern United Kingdom study
at 74%.79 Less than perfect response rates often raise questions about the sample,80 and one cannot help
suspect a correlation between the likelihood of responding to a survey with the likelihood of spontaneously
reporting.81
What is initially noticeable about the Italian and Dutch surveys is that their results do not seem at all
similar to their respective portions of the European Union study. Oddly, although the Italian study focused
on a particularly weak reporting area, its data indicated that its participants report much more often than
those in the European Union-Italian study, which was nationwide. This casts signicant doubt on the ability
of these studies to accurately represent reporting rates. However, they may still be relatively useful for
descriptive purposes, for instance in analyzing why doctors do not report. Given no reason to believe one
study more accurate than another, they have all been included. Unlike the Italian and Dutch surveys, the
results of the two United Kingdom-based surveys, displayed in Table 1, were somewhat similar.
For these reasons, the studies should be looked at as demonstrative aids, not as accurate reections of physi-
cian attitudes.
77Belton, 52 Eur. J. Clinical Pharmacology at 424, supra note 49.
78Id.
79Bateman, supra note 64, at 421.
80See Williams, supra note 58, at 258.
81In a Letter to the Editor published in the British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, W. H. W. Inman, developer
of the United Kingdom's Yellow Card system questioned the validity of the United Kingdom portion of the European Union
study published in 1995 and described above. He stated,
It seems doubtful, however, if the author's survey could give valid conclusions when only 57% of the doctors in their sample
returned questionnaires, in spite of reminders to non-responders. It is very unlikely, for example, that doctors who were
worried about legal liability or had feelings of guilt for having harmed a patient would have admitted this and returned the
questionnaires.
Inman, supra note 33, at 434.
19III.
Limitations of Spontaneous Reporting Systems and Improvement
Options
This section will discuss problems with spontaneous reporting systems worldwide and analyzes potential av-
enues for handling them. The issues include: whether reporting and how to report is instilled in physicians,
the quality of reports, uncertainty as to whether a drug caused a reaction, time pressures that hinder re-
porting, liability concerns of reporting, publishing aspirations that stie reporting, and patient involvement
in reporting.
Before proceeding, it may be worth questioning the assumption throughout this piece that it would be
preferable to increase reporting rates. While 5.2% reporting may be too low, 100% reporting may be neither
feasible nor ideal. The handling costs of this much reporting would be very high and it is likely that the
time saved would be marginal. To nd the ideal reporting rate, it would be worthwhile analyze how much
data is required for the FDA to take denitive preventative action, how quickly it can be accumulated and
how much healthcare time ought to be sacriced for this cause. Assuming that the ideal rate is somewhere
between the current 5.2% rate and complete reporting, it may be worthwhile to adopt some of the methods
discussed below that would increase the quantity of ADE reports led. Options for improving the quality of
reporting are also described in this section.
20A.
21Reporting is not fully \ingrained"
One reason commonly cited for low reporting rates is that reporting is not ingrained in practitioners; it
is not habitual. While this lack of routineness may aect reporting rates, it is worth noting early on that
there are many other obstacles to the quantity of reports being led. These are discussed further in the piece.
1.
Frequency of reporting
Data from around the world shows that reporting is not habitual. Despite the revamping of the spontaneous
reporting system, it is not clear that American physicians are ingrained with ADE reporting habits. While
the mid-1980's estimate of 1% reporting quintupled by 1994 post-MedWatch, over 94% of all reportable
adverse events are still not reported in the United States.82 A minimum of 30% of respondents in the foreign
studies had never reported an ADR, let alone on a continuous basis. The studies are silent on the frequency
of reporting, for those who have reported. Also remarkable is result of the Irish study indicating that 90% of
the respondents had diagnosed an ADR that they had not reported. The Dutch study had similar responses,
ranging by practice group from 72% to 86% of respondents who had not reported diagnosed ADRs.83
Unawareness of reporting systems does not seem to be the cause of underreporting. The percentages of
doctors who admit to not knowing how to report ADRs to national health authorities is in the twenty per-
82Landow, supra note 2 at 192.
83Eland, supra note 60, at 624.
22cent range. This would seem to explain why some doctors have never reported. However, in the Italian
study, while seventy percent of its respondents claimed to know how to report ADRs to the agencies, a data
analysis showed that the reporting rates were similar for those who claimed to be aware of the procedures
and those who did not, indicating that lack of awareness may not be the driving force of non-reporting.
Additionally, in many of the studies there were signicantly more respondents who had never reported than
those who claimed ignorance of how to report. After the 1993 publicity campaign, it is hard to believe that
many doctors in the United States could still be unaware of MedWatch, regardless of how the awareness has
aected their reporting habits. Therefore, while reporting is not yet habitual for physicians, it is probably
not because they are unaware of the reporting system.
2.
Reporting biases
It has been suggested that spontaneous reporting is often subject to reporting biases, and these may reect
the fact that reporting is not habitual. Spontaneous reporting information is received in an uncontrolled
and anecdotal way such that many factors can inuence which types of reactions are more likely to be
reported.84 Some suggest that spontaneous reporting systems like MedWatch are inherently biased toward
collecting certain reactions. For example, it makes sense that promotional claims, reports in the medical
literature, and the media aect reporting.85 If reporting were truly ingrained these would not seriously aect
84See Landow, supra note 2, at 192.
85See Stanley A. Edlavitch, Ph.D, Adverse Drug Event Reporting, Improving the Low US Reporting Rates, 148 Archives
Internal Med. 1499, 1500 (1988).
23reporting habits. The length of time the product is on the market86 and the publicity of other reactions
to the drug also signicantly aect reporting. Products that have been on the market for a long time may
tend to be reported on less frequently since their reactions are assumed to be well known. Some of these
disparities can be partially alleviated by making clear what should and should not be reported, and by in-
culcating reporting habits. This may increase reporting of all ADRs, not just those in the media, for example.
3.
Awareness of spontaneous reporting system benets
The attitudinal studies cast doubt on whether medical professionals are aware of the importance of sponta-
neous reporting. Although the Italian study showed virtually no respondents stating that reporting systems
are not valuable, the South African study had between 19 and 37% of its respondents essentially agreeing,
depending on practice area. This data indicates that some physicians may not understand the value of
reporting, which can certainly aect how they prioritize it.
Some practitioners do not know what purposes spontaneous reporting systems serve. For example, the re-
spondents in the Italian study largely misunderstood the purposes of spontaneous reporting systems. Many
(63.9%) thought they measure the incidence of ADRs, a function that they cannot eectively carry out. This
may not be so meaningful given Italy's poor reporting history. However, doctors in the United Kingdom
study also lacked a key insight into reporting. What particularly concerned the authors of the UK study
was that a \high proportion of all doctor groups were unaware that yellow card data is used extensively
86See Landow, supra note 2, at 192.
24to compare the toxicity of drugs in a similar therapeutic class."87This overall ignorance of the benets and
purposes of spontaneous reporting systems hinders the ability of the systems to function eciently.
4.
In whom is reporting ingrained?
It is noticeable that the reporting data varies largely between practice groups. The EU study data showed
that fewer specialists than general practitioners, across the board, had ever reported ADRs. In the Dutch
study, only 38% of the surgical specialists had ever reported ADRs, while the medical specialists and general
practitioners' responses were 68% and 64% respectively. Correspondingly, the surgical specialists in the
Dutch survey were much less likely to be aware of the need to report ADRs. The surgical specialists in the
South African survey claimed to have observed far fewer ADRs than the other two groups and understood
the value of reporting the least, and none had ever reported an ADR. 88 About 70% of the respondents in the
Irish study had reported an ADR at some point, but the rate was higher for the general practitioners than
for the hospital doctors.89 It is worthwhile to mention that the Dutch survey found that the age, gender and
time since specialization did not show signicant eects on the results.90 These practice group variations
may be telling as to where our attentions ought to be focused. If surgical specialists hardly see ADRs, which
may be predictable, perhaps attempting to shift their attitudes about reporting is not as worthwhile as for
those practitioners who often face ADRs. On the other hand, perhaps it may be best to particularly focus
87Bateman, supra note 64, at 426.
88Robins, supra note 66, at 131, 133.
89Williams, supra note 58, at 257.
90Eland, supra note 60, at 625.
25on these groups who are under-informed because if they hardly see ADRs it may be because they tend to
come across ADRs that are more rare. Also, if a whole practice area fails to report on a continuous basis,
there will be a whole set of ADRs, those that arise in that particular medical eld, for which there will not
be reports. Therefore, it may be best to focus attitude-shifting eorts especially on those particular medical
elds that do not report often and do not see so many ADRs. Further study into practice group distinctions
would be meaningful in order to determine how to deal with these dierences.
The reporting population can also be divided according to profession. Trends in reporting habits may be
meaningful if physicians, pharmacists and nurses are analyzed separately. After MedWatch, the percent of
reports from pharmacists increased from 56% to 70%, while the percent from physicians dropped from 22%
to 15%.91 As an explanation for this shift, the study's authors hypothesized that physicians were reporting
the events to the hospital pharmacists who, in turn, submitted the reports.92 Unfortunately, while the
attitudinal studies focused on physicians, they did not solicit information about whether the responding
doctors had ever assigned anyone in their medical sta to report an ADR. Also, since attitudinal studies
have generally focused on physician reporting, it is hard to know how ingrained reporting is for pharmacists
and nurses. These individuals may be a less-tapped audience for improving reporting rates, as reporters on
their own initiative or as delegates for reporting.
91Piazza-Hepp, supra note 47, at 1437-38.
92Id. at 1438.
265.
To whom do reporters report?
Those practitioners that do report ADRs vary in their preferences of reporting to a national agency or a
pharmaceutical company. The data in the EU study showed that doctors across the European Union, with
the exception of Italy, Portugal, and Ireland, tend to report to national agencies at a much higher rate than
they report to the pharmaceutical manufacturers.93 The Dutch and South African surveys revealed some
telling distinctions between types of practitioners. In the Netherlands, the general practitioners preferred
reporting to the national reporting center,94 while the medical and surgical specialists preferred reporting to
the pharmaceutical industry.95 One wonders about the reason for such dierences. Are medical specialists
targeted more directly by pharmaceutical promotions, leading them to think of manufacturers automatically
when they encounter adverse reactions? The authors of the study explained that medical specialists might
report more often to pharmaceutical companies because those practitioners are more often involved in clini-
cal trials with the companies.96 In the South African study, a total of 64.5% of the respondents considered
it necessary to advise an agency of an ADR, but signicantly more medical specialists thought so (88.5%),
with general practitioners and surgical specialists trailing at 52.5% and 68.5% respectively.97 However, more
general practitioners than other doctors favored informing the pharmaceutical representative about ADRs
(GP:68%, MS:42%, SS:31.5%).98Ironically, these trends are not at all consistent with the Dutch gures, in
93Belton, 52 Eur. J. Clinical Pharmacology at 424, supra note 49. It is worth noting that Portugal's national reporting
system had only just been established around the time of the survey, therefore the survey data may not reect a real preference
to report to manufacturers. See id. at 426-27.
94Eland, supra note 60, at 624.
95Id.
96Id. at 625.
97Robins, supra note 66, at 131-32.
98Id. at 132. The questions here asked \Do you consider it necessary to advise any outside agency of an ADR and, if so,
whom?" and \Do you tell the pharmaceutical representatives about the ADR" (usually yes or usually no). Id. at 132. Because
neither question solicited direct data about whether the individual respondents had reported to either of these groups, I did
not include their responses in Table 1 under those titles. However, the results do seem to have some illustrative value.
27which the general practitioners preferred reporting to the health authority but the other two groups preferred
reporting to the manufacturer. It is certainly not clear whether there are coherent preferences based on pro-
fessional specialty. However, such trends may signify dierences in why doctors nd reporting important
and to whom they feel they have a duty to report. These attitudinal variations may have the potential to
clarify reasons for underreporting.
6.
How can we make reporting more ingrained?
a.
Informative advertising
In the United States, more \advertising" is not likely to dramatically change reporting habits. Any informed
doctor or other medical health practitioner should have noted the 1993 modications since they were preva-
lent in the medical literature. If the barrage of MedWatch information in 1993 had only a limited impact on
doctors, it is logical to assume that additional advertising eorts will only have marginal benets except in
informing new doctors. Medical school students may be the only meaningful beneciaries of informational
eorts to inculcate the importance of reporting adverse events.
b.
28Mandatory reporting by physicians
It does not seem clear that requiring health care practitioners to report adverse reactions would have any
signicant eect on reporting rates. France, Sweden, Norway and Italy all mandate reporting but their
reporting rates are still low.99 Interestingly, about 20% of respondents in the Italian study said that the
legal requirements mandating reporting were a factor in deciding to report.100This is relevant in assessing
whether mandating reporting would be valuable, since it indicates that a sense of legal obligation encourages
reporting. Despite that statistic, perhaps the most signicant reason for the ineectiveness of mandating
reporting is that the standards of what needs to be reported are simply too ambiguous to give eect to a
mandatory adverse reaction reporting system. Since it is not often clear whether the reaction was caused
by the drug, it would be very hard to insist upon reporting, and even harder to enforce such a system. If
non-reporters were subject to criminal or civil penalties a mens rea requirement would be hard to fulll in
many cases where the drug and reaction were not clearly linked. How causally linked must the have been
in order to establish that a doctor knew she should have reported but did not? It is not clear that an
attempt at such enforcement is the best use of our resources. Moreover, requiring reporting would attach an
even greater negative stigma to the process than already exists, particularly if non-reporters were subject to
criminal penalties or civil damages.
At this point what is most lacking is a feeling of ethical or moral obligation to report out of a sense of
necessity or importance. The MedWatch program is not simply a repository of useless paperwork; it serves
an important social goal. Requiring reporting by attaching a hypothetical threat to not reporting may se-
riously harm the attitudes of medical professionals by creating a negative association with reporting, while
being unable to achieve the desired result. Attempting to dissolve the obstacles to voluntary reporting and
99See Robins, supra note 66, at 134; Cosentino, supra note 55, at 85.
100Cosentino, supra note 55, at 86.
29continuing to instill a sense of obligation or duty would likely be more successful than mandating reporting.
c.
Conclusions
While neither of these mechanisms seem particularly eective in further ingraining reporting in physicians,
it is not clear that lack of inherent tendency to report is really the biggest limit to the quantity of reports
being led. The rest of this article will discuss other potential obstacles to frequent reporting. Furthermore,
even a relatively low percent of reporting can be very useful if it provides the desired information. Perhaps
improvement eorts targeted at report quality, discussed in the upcoming section, would be more useful than
those targeted at report quantity.
B.
How selective and comprehensive is reporting?
While the quantity of reports received by a spontaneous reporting system is important, the quality of those
reports is equally important. The quality assessment has two parts. The rst is whether the reaction should
have been reported at all. For example, the MedWatch system solicits serious and unexpected events only.
The fraction of reports that meet the desired reporting qualications determines how \selective" a system's
reports are. The second part of the qualitative assessment is whether the report includes the essential infor-
mation. Reports should include the patient's baseline status, medical history, laboratory and clinical data
30in support of the event diagnosis, and the duration of the drug therapy.101; 102; 103This second qualitative
element can be described as \comprehensiveness."
1.
The studies
The data shows that many physicians are generally aware of what reactions should and should not be
reported. Overall, the physicians in the studies displayed in Table 1 seemed to understand the major reasons
for reporting ADRs, with the notable exception of those in the Italian study. Only about 58% of the doctors
in the Italian study correctly identied that according to Italian law all suspected reactions to any drug on
the market should be reported.104 Furthermore, less than 40% of the Italians surveyed agreed with any of the
propositions about why to report: unusualness of the reaction, severity of the reaction, or involvement of a
new drug. However, given that the Italian study focused on an area with minimal reporting, this may not be
shocking. An American study did nd signicant selectivity improvements when it analyzed reporting data
before and after MedWatch, focusing on 1992-1994.105 The results showed that the percentage of reports that
were serious increased from 34% to 49%, advancing MedWatch's selective reporting goal.106 The eorts to
clarify what should be reported seem to have been useful. For example, the MedWatch Voluntary Reporting
Form lists what is \reportable" in very user-friendly terms and this type of additional guidance may have
101See Piazza-Hepp, supra note 47, at 1438.
102It is unlikely that patients will report concomitant use of alcohol or sedative-hypnotic agents even if they are used. See
Shader, supra note 38, at 303.
103Critics assert that MedWatch does not ask enough relevant questions. It does not explicitly ask about the use of over-the-
counter drugs, vitamins, or health and dietary supplements, all of which are important in explaining adverse events. See id.
104Cosentino, supra note 55, at 87.
105Piazza-Hepp, supra note 47 at 1438.
106Id. at 1437-38.
31been critical in enhancing selectivity.107
It appears that the selectivity of reports is somewhat related to where they are submitted. A pre-MedWatch
study in the United States showed that reports submitted directly by physicians to the FDA had a higher
proportion of serious reactions (30%) than manufacturer-submitted reports (18%).108 The data is stark in an
earlier study, in 1970, which showed that although physicians directly reported only 1% of the total reports,
they identied 24% of all the ADRs that resulted in labeling changes that year.109 A United Kingdom study
in 1983 found that physician-direct reports led to the investigation of 72% of the most serious ADRs since
the thalidomide crisis in the early 1960's.110 These gures indicate that physicians do have a fairly accurate
ability to determine which reactions are more signicant, and they may tend to report them directly to the
spontaneous reporting systems.
However, while some physicians know the fundamentals, they seem to be unaware of important details on
what should be reported. For example, 27.2% of the doctors in the Dutch study would not report an ADR
if the patient had purchased the drug over the counter.111 The reasons for this are unclear. This may reect
assumptions that the reactions must be too well known to report or that over-the-counter drugs must be
safe. Regardless of why they do not report these, this is evidence of a misunderstanding about reportable
ADRs. Another example of this type of misunderstanding is in the United Kingdom. In the EU-UK112
survey, participants were specically asked whether they knew the signicance of the black triangle symbol
that appears in various places, including advertising literature for new products.113
107See MedWatch Voluntary Reporting Form, App. B.
108Faich, 151 Archives Internal Med. at 1647, supra note 17.
109H. Denman Scott, MD et al., Physician Reporting of Adverse Drug Reactions, 263 JAMA 1785, 1785 (1990).
110See id. at 1785-86 (citing to G. R. Venning, Identication of adverse reactions to new drugs, II: how were 18 important
adverse reactions discovered and with what delays?, 286 Brit. Med. J. 365 (1983)).
111Eland, supra note 60, at 625.
112The United Kingdom segment of the European Union study
113Belton, 39 Br. J. Clinical Pharmacology at 225, supra note 54.
The black triangle symbol means that the CSM is paying specic attention to the medication and wants enhanced reporting
of all ADRs, not just serious ones. This symbol is generally used with new products.
If you see the black triangle symbol
32against a product entry in the British National Formulary (BNF), MIMS, the ABPI Compendium
of Datasheets and Summaries of Product Characteristics and advertising material, this indicates that the
[Committee on Safety of Medicines]/[Medicines Control Agency] are intensively monitoring that product.
A black triangle will be assigned to a product if the drug is a new active substance. However, a product con-
taining previously licensed active substances may also be monitored if it meets one or more of the following
criteria:

a new combination of active substances;
 administration via a novel route or drug delivery system;
 a signicant new indication which may alter the established risk/benet prole of that drug.
This last criteria has recently been added at the request of the CSM.
The CSM/MCA wish to receive all suspected ADRs associated with these products in order
to conrm the risk/benet prole established during the pre-marketing phase. The black
triangle drugs are monitored closely for a minimum of two years and the black triangle
symbol is not removed until the safety of the drug is well established.
Committee on Safety of Medicines web page, accessible through http://www.open.gov.uk (last accessed
April 6, 2001). In total, 64% of the respondents correctly identied that the symbol meant that all suspected
reactions to the product should be reported. However, only 48% of those surveyed knew that the symbol
indicated a new drug, and only 39% knew both facts.114 Also, the general practitioners were better informed
about the black triangle classication than the hospital doctors.115 Similarly, in the UK-only study, as in the
EU-UK study, a very high proportion of doctors, especially the hospital doctors, were unfamiliar with the
purpose of the CSM's black triangle symbol. Therefore, many physicians lack knowledge of certain critical
details of ADR reporting.
The quality of reports, as determined by rates of inclusion of important information, was generally higher after
MedWatch.116 One factor that is important in assessing comprehensiveness is who is doing the reporting.
Post-MedWatch, both pharmacists and physicians report the proper information equally, with the exception
of the patient's medical history.117 The fact that pharmacists have limited access to patient histories may
explain why they include them less often. Given the overall high quality of pharmacist reports, perhaps
eorts to enhance their reporting tendencies would be benecial.
While medical professionals have a general understanding of what to report, eorts to increase their under-
standing of the details of individual reporting systems may be valuable. Methods for improving selectivity
114Belton, 39 Br. J. Clinical Pharmacology at 225, supra note 54.
115Id.
116Piazza-Hepp, supra note 47, at 1437-38.
117Id. at 1438.
33are discussed in the next section. Comprehensiveness is less of a concern given that the details of what ought
to be reported can be neatly summarized on reporting forms. Given that the only clear way to improve this
is through educational eorts, other options for improving comprehensiveness will not be discussed in the
next section.
2.
How can selectivity be maximized?
As always, education can be cited as a mechanism for improving selectivity, particularly for those areas of
reporting which are misunderstood. However, although it may be useful to improve overall selectivity, per-
haps what would be most valuable would be to target eorts so as to maximize the combination of quantity
and selectivity. This would involve increasing reporting for certain medications, those that we generally have
diculty learning about. Particularly with uncommonly prescribed medications, it seems that a signicant
delay in discovering adverse reactions could be avoided with increased targeted reporting driven by media
campaigns.
a.
Targeting through reporting requirements
Adoption of a targeted reporting system like that of the United Kingdom could signicantly enhance the
selectivity of reports without creating ambiguity as to what needs to be reported. This would somewhat
34eviscerate the need for an overall increase in reporting. The United Kingdom places a black triangle symbol,
?, on medications in which the Committee on Safety of Medicines is particularly interested. While the United
Kingdom uses this symbol only for medications that have been on the market for less than two years, there
is certainly the potential to use it more exibly. For example, it may be possible to collect data more quickly
on obscure medications if the symbol were also put on them. If higher reporting rates would only really be
benecial for those medications that are not used in quantity (because no signicant amount of time until
discovery of ADRs would be saved for the others), this might be a sensible option. This strategy would focus
attention on those medicines that are of particular concern, while continuing the inow of information about
other drugs to monitor them for unforeseen reactions. However, it is clear that a new regime such as this
would require a signicant awareness campaign so as to avoid the situation in the United Kingdom where
doctors are not familiar with the symbol and its meaning.
b.
Targeting through questionnaires
One useful method for compiling adverse reactions is sending questionnaires to medical practitioners. A
1977-78 New Zealand study tried to determine the reasons for the cessation of therapy with certain medi-
cations.118 The study monitored specic new drugs, which were dispensed only from hospital pharmacies,
throughout the rst year of their release.119 In an eort to determine why doctors would cease therapy
with the drugs, the researchers sent questionnaires to the prescribing doctors after it was clear that their
118D. M. Coulter, MB, ChB, DTM & H, Study of Reasons for Cessation of Therapy with Perhexiline Meleate, Sodium
Valproate and Labetalol in the Intensied Adverse Reaction Reporting Scheme, 93 N.Z. Med. J. 81 (1981).
119Id. at 82.
35patients were no longer taking the medications.120 The response rate to the questionnaires was 81 per-
cent.121 The results showed that often an adverse event had caused the termination of use.122 Moreover,
the information received from the questionnaires did not duplicate that which had already been received
through spontaneous reporting.123 Events reported spontaneously were a less select group of events and did
not always result in termination of the drug's use.124 This surveying increased the yield of adverse events
about these medications by almost 100%.125 The study concluded that \examination of reasons for cessa-
tion of therapy is a useful adjunct to spontaneous reporting of adverse events," especially for drugs being
monitored intensively.126 This type of system, while costly, can be used to monitor medications that are of
particular concern. This would allow increased attention to certain suspect medications without detracting
from spontaneous reporting of other drugs.
C.
Uncertainty of the cause of a reaction interferes with reporting
Some reaction causes are inherently dicult to identify. Since many patients take multiple drugs it is par-
ticularly hard to identify which drug caused a reaction and whether the combination itself caused it. As
Dr. Glen Grin put it in his article in Postgraduate Medicine urging people to report, \[s]ince many
people are taking more than one medication at a time, the opportunities for unanticipated drug reactions
120Id.
121Id.
122Id. For the three medications, Perhexiline, Valproate, and Labetalol, adverse events were stated as the reason for cessation
of therapy in 20%, 15% and 43% of the cases respectively. Id.
123Id. at 83-84.
124Id.
125Id.
126Id. at 81, 84.
36become mind-boggling."127 This, of course, results in a hesitancy to report, as revealed in the South African
study in which an overwhelming number of doctors included multiple medications as an important factor
in explaining underreporting.128 Also, adverse reactions with long latency or those that produce unusual
symptoms are not quickly even recognized as ADRs.129The time delay of some reactions and oddness of
others can make their causes seem very uncertain, especially if the patient has been on multiple medications.
Although there does not seem to be an easy solution to these problems, reporting systems could encourage
doctors to report these uncertainties nonetheless. It may be preferable to receive reports about adverse
reactions attributable to one of a few drugs than not to receive them at all. This may also aid in highlighting
adverse reactions caused by drug interactions.
Other evidence of uncertainty concerns is found in the South African study where over ten percent of the
participants agreed that the concept of a \drug event" rather than a \drug reaction" would have a better
reporting response because it does not directly \incriminate" the drug.130This anxiety is probably correlated
with a reluctance to commit to a conclusion when there is insucient evidence of an ADR. Shifting from a
drug reaction system to a drug event system essentially decreases the blame on the drug because it allows
for the possibility of errors leading to the adverse event. This distinction, while sensible on paper, seems
wholly linguistic. Unless a doctor knows that the suspected drug event was caused by human error of some
nature, he would normally report it as a suspected adverse drug reaction. And if the doctor does have
reason to believe that the event was caused by human error, it is questionable whether reporting it would be
valuable to a spontaneous reporting system. Therefore, other than dissolving mental uncertainty barriers to
reporting, the shift from ADRs to ADEs may not be more useful than emphasizing that medical professionals
127Glen C. Grin, MD et al., Report Every Adverse Drug Reaction! We're all in this together, 101 Postgraduate Med. 13,
14 (1997).
128See Robins, supra note 66, at 133.
129See Edlavitch, supra note 85, at 1500.
130Robins, supra note 66, at 133, 134.
37need only suspect that the drug caused the reaction.
D.
Medical health practitioners do not have time to report
1.
Time is a limitation to reporting
Undoubtedly one of the biggest reasons for underreporting is that the modern physician is faced with tem-
poral and economic pressures such that it may not seem worthwhile for him to spend time reporting. The
information in Table 1 suggests that time may be a big factor in reporting rates. Furthermore, in the UK
study, in those areas with low reporting rates, the doctors seemed to be spending more time in actual contact
with the patients,131 suggesting that there may be some correlation between time and reporting rates.
It is worth questioning the reasons behind the balance in priorities that has been struck. Is it really better
to spend the extra thirty minutes132 with patients or spend the time reporting an adverse reaction? For the
131Bateman, supra note 64, at 425. Additionally, there was less of an appreciation for the benets of the Yellow Card system
in the low reporting areas, which lends support for the conclusion that the physicians' level of appreciation aects the priority
of reporting.
Interestingly, the general practitioners and junior hospital doctors in the low reporting areas wrote more prescriptions in
comparison to the doctors in the higher reporting rate areas, so those in the low reporting areas probably diagnosed more
ADRs. Id.
132The MedWatch form states \The public reporting burden for this collection of information has been estimated to average 30
minutes per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining
the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information." MedWatch Voluntary Reporting Form, App. B.
38individual patient the former is preferable, but for society, the latter may be preferable. To whom is the
doctor's duty? It is clear that cost-benet decisions must occur in these prioritization situations, but who
makes them and are they knowingly made?
The medical culture of this decade has emphasized the economics of health care, leading to changes in the
way doctors provide medical care. Doctors are limited in the amount of time they can spend with patients,
and most doctors would probably prefer to spend the time with the patient who has suered an adverse
reaction rather than on describing the occurrence on a form. The FDA's position of already limiting re-
porting to what is serious and new suggests a policy decision that patient time should not be wasted on
what we already know; only information that would signicantly aid the community is worth the temporal
sacrice.133The diverging interests with which doctors struggle parallel the legal services lawyer's ethical
dilemma: whether to spend time representing a client in a \small" case or spend their time working on a law
reform project which will aect hundreds of people. There is some duty to do both, which creates diculty
since time is limited. Moreover, many doctors are stuck in the middle of another balance: working for their
patients and their employer HMOs, two groups that put diverging pressures on physician time. In this light,
it is easier to understand their predicament and harder to decide what course of conduct they should choose.
133Of course, the FDA policy of only soliciting certain reports may have more to do with FDA resources then with physician
time, so it may still be worth analyzing whether the overall social benet from broader reporting outweighs the social cost in
terms of physician time.
392.
Changing the priority balance
Among the options for changing this priority balance and non-reporting attitudes is providing incentives for
reporting. Clearly this would only be preferable if we nd the present balance undesirable. To the extent
that the current balance results from economic pressures to serve more patients, an incentive system may
have some weight in changing it. The United Kingdom study, which actually asked respondents whether
they felt they should be compensated for their time, indicates that this might be promising.
It is possible that an incentive structure will pass reporting procedures into the hands of other health care
professionals or sta members, whose time, although also valuable to the patient, may be preferable to donate
to this cause. Depending on the complexity, it may not be too dicult for sta members to provide most, if
not all, of the relevant reporting information by getting a summary from the doctor and looking through a
patient's le.134 Much of the information currently required by the FDA does not require thorough medical
knowledge.
Perhaps the biggest impediment to creating an incentive based system is that no single group or actor bears
the brunt of the billions in annual costs created by toxic eects of medications. While in sum it may be
economically benecial and more ecient to prevent adverse reactions through a mechanism like an incentive
system, it may not be in any individual group's interest to take that nancial responsibility. The costs of
adverse reactions are currently spread among various groups: patients, the government, insurance companies,
and pharmaceutical companies, to name a few. It is, nevertheless, valuable to consider the possibility of
incentive programs since if they were worthwhile, nancial backing could possibly be achieved through joint
ventures or other means.
134See Williams, supra note 58, at 260 (suggesting that nurses could take over some reporting duties).
40One possible system for nancial incentives would give doctors or their employers a monetary \reward" for
reporting adverse drug reactions. The rst question is who would provide this reward? Both pharmaceu-
tical companies and insurance companies may have some economic reasons to participate in such a system
since they each bear signicant costs from adverse reactions. Pharmaceutical companies have been paying
enormous tort damage awards to consumers who have been seriously adversely aected by their products.
Insurance companies face daily hospital bills from adverse reactions. Depending on the costs of implementing
an eective system like this, it may be more ecient to prevent these reactions and the subsequent lawsuits
and hospital bills by discovering problems earlier. Both groups stand to gain if ADRs are prevented in the
rst place. Of course, even if this is true, it is somewhat perverse to expect pharmaceutical companies to
pay doctors to give them distressing information about problems with their drugs. The second question is
to whom would the reward be paid? If it were paid directly to the doctors, it may aect their attitudes but
may not change the priorities in the environment where they work. If it were paid to health organizations
employing doctors, it may result in a more pro-reporting environment but may have less of a direct eect
on the doctors' individual attitudes.
One Irish study actually attempted to stimulate reporting by using a fee.135 The study, published in 1990,
oered junior doctors at a hospital three Irish punts (equivalent to about 4.5 United States Dollars at the
1990 conversion rates)136 if they completed yellow cards (reporting forms).137 Collection of the reports for
six weeks showed a dramatic increase in reporting. The incentive \increased the rate of reporting almost 50-
fold."138 Forty eight percent of the doctors in the survey reported reactions, compared to the baseline 10%
135John Feely et al., Stimulating reporting of adverse drug reactions by using a fee, 300 Brit. Med. J. 22 (1990).
136The historical conversion rate was determined from data found at http://www.ozforex.com.au/home.htm?http://www.ozforex.com.au/newhome.htm
(last accessed April 9, 2001).
137Feely, 300 Brit. Med. J. at 22, supra note 135.
138Id. at 23.
41gure. Random testing showed conrmation of the adverse reactions in over ninety percent of the cases.139
Of the forty doctors that reported, thirty-two said that the fee was an incentive to report. Unfortunately,
after the study was complete and the payments stopped, the number of reports fell dramatically.140This
eort seems to show that an incentive system can be meaningful. It is surprising how small a fee was ef-
fective in this study. Perhaps the fee was more of a reminder to the doctors than an incentive. It would
be interesting to know if reporting rates would have continued to be high during a longer-term period given
that the monetary compensation was minimal.
a.
Ethics and the Law
If pharmaceutical companies establish a \reward" system like this, there may be serious ethical concerns.
However, it is not clear that this would fall outside the boundaries dictated by medical ethics. The American
Medical Association Ethical Guidelines for doctors seek to prevent pharmaceutical companies from \owning"
doctors. Gifts from the industry to physicians are limited to those that entail a benet to patients and are
not of substantive value.141 The key question is whether a reporting incentive is even a gift under the
guidelines. If it is a \payment" which is proportional to the task done and benet provided, it is arguably
not a gift. More broadly however, the question is one of making the physicians indebted to industry.
Guideline 6, on gifts from industry, adequately summarizes this concern. \No gifts should be accepted if
there are strings attached. For example, physicians should not accept gifts if they are given in relation to the
139Id.
140Id.
141American Medical Association E-Addendum II: Council on Ethical and Judicial Aairs Clarication Gifts to Physicians
from Industry (E-8.061) available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf online/pf online?f n=browse&doc=policyfiles/CEJA/E-002.0.HTM&&s t=&st p=&nth=1&nxt pol=policyfiles/CEJA/E-000.01.HTM&
(last accessed April 6, 2001).
42physician's prescribing practices."142 Regardless of whether or not these incentives are accurately dened as
\gifts," doctors receiving routine payments from industry raises legitimate conict of interest concerns. In
Britain, the Royal College of Physicians studied the physician-industry relationship. It published a report
that emphasized the importance of a close relationship for the treatment of patients and the assessment
of new drugs, but at the same time emphasized the need for doctors to be impartial and honest.143 \The
overriding principle is that any benet in cash or kind, any gift, and hospitality, or any subsidy received from
a pharmaceutical company must leave the doctor's independence of judgment manifestly unimpaired."144
The Federal Medicare and Medicaid Anti-kickback statute also inuences the legality of this proposal. The
Department of Health and Human Services Oce of Inspector General released a \Special Fraud Alert" on
Aug. 23, 1994 specifying certain practices that could result in an investigation. \If just one purpose of a
marketing scheme is to induce the prescription of a drug reimbursable by Medicaid, then the criminal anti-
kickback statute is implicated and the physician, pharmacy, or supplier receiving payment could be subject
to criminal prosecution and exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid."145 This was intended to prevent risk
from doctors whose judgment may be impaired by payments.146It seems unavoidable that a system like the
one proposed above would conict with the language of this alert. Rewards for reporting adverse reactions
are probably a form of \marketing scheme" and would likely induce changes in prescribing behavior. Still,
because of the possibility of creating exceptions to the ethical rules and kickback laws, it may be valid to
question the assumption that, in sum, this would be detrimental to patients.
142Id.
143See Fred Rosener, Ethical relationships between drug companies and the medical profession, 102 Am. C. Chest Physicians
266 (1992).
144Id. (summarizing the British report).
145See Fraud Alert Outlines Potentially Illegal Prescription Drug Marketing Activities, BNA Health Care Daily, Aug. 24,
1994 (citing to the Department of Health and Human Services Oce of Inspector General `Special Fraud Alert').
146See id.
43b.
Prescribing Habits
An incentive system may lead doctors to prefer one company's drug to another's. If the amount of \reward"
were left to the pharmaceutical company's discretion, the conict of interest concerns associated with other
\gifts" would remain because companies could vie for the selection of their products by oering the highest
rewards. But if there were one standard amount for this reward, it would signicantly preempt much of the
conict of interest since competition over reward values would not exist. Of course, this xed rate would
probably have to be statutorily permitted in order to overcome the anti-kickback statute as well as any
antitrust issues. Additionally, competition would be most eectively \stied" if all of the pharmaceutical
manufacturers participated. Otherwise, incentives would still exist for favoring one product over another.
Practically speaking, this concern is of little signicance. In order for an optional system to work, it must be
in industries' nancial interests to pay this reward for information that will save them millions in litigation
costs. If that is correct, there is a strong incentive for all companies to participate. Moreover, the risk of
having another company sway prescription habits will also create this incentive. Finally, any concern about
small businesses not being able to compete with industry giants because of nancial limitations may not be
realistic in a market composed largely of giants. These small actors, if they cannot aord a more ecient
system, will be those who likely cannot aord to compensate the tort victims, and to the extent they are
selected out of the market, it may be in accordance with society's policy choices favoring tort compensation.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that it is desirable to further increase the entry costs into the pharmaceutical
market, especially if a system like this essentially \forces" smaller companies to pay a reward even if for
44them it is not economically preferable to paying tort damages.
Still, if an incentive system is at all eective, prescribing habits will necessarily change. Since newer drugs
are more likely to have adverse reactions, and therefore result in more \rewards," there is a risk that that
this type of incentive may have some subconscious swaying eect in choosing between two \equivalent"
medications. Already physicians are pressured by patient and doctor advertising to prescribe newer medica-
tions. In an editorial published in the Journal of the American Medical Society Dr. Alastair Wood
wrote \[p]hysicians have a major role in the prevention of adverse drug reactions and should resist marketing
pressures to prescribe new and potentially more toxic drugs in preference to prescribing well-established
safer drugs."147 One result of a bias toward newer drugs is that while short-term adverse reactions will be
more quickly reported due to increased reporting and a higher sample size, longer-term adverse reactions
will aect a larger number of people if new medications are more often prescribed. It would be important
to factor in this cost when determining the desirability of an incentive structure.
The problems would be similar if insurance companies or even the FDA took on the task of administering
an incentive program. However, some of the ethical concerns would be diminished, particularly if the Food
and Drug Administration established such a program. It does not seem that the ethical concerns would be
substantially reduced if a health organization were receiving the reporting fee and not the doctor individu-
ally. The bias simply would be transferred to the organizational level. In all of these cases the problem of
creating undesirable prescribing habits favoring riskier medications would remain, so in the end the increased
reporting may not be worth the increased risks, even if this were nancially feasible.
147Alastair J.J. Wood, MD, The Safety of New Medicines: The Importance of Asking the Right Questions, 281 JAMA 1753,
1754 (1999).
453.
Note on reporting facility improvements
American physicians may not be aware of how easy reporting has become with the recent advent of web
reporting. The option of online reporting may be more convenient than paper or phone reporting, however
there has been no wave of media attention to this alternative, so many may not know of its existence. There-
fore publicity about Internet reporting may be worthwhile.
E.
Liability concerns stie reporting
1.
Is liability really a concern and why?
Despite the data in Table 1 suggesting otherwise, there is reason to believe that the liability factor may play
a role in stiing reporting. Some studies in the United States have shown higher rates of concern for liability
from reporting. The Food and Drug Administration itself, in proposing new regulations on adverse event
report condentiality, cited to studies that show a reluctance to report due to liability concerns.
46It is well recognized that many physicians are concerned about the potential for involvement
in litigation by their patients or third parties. In a 1992 survey of physicians regarding
adverse event reporting, over 37 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that
reporting increases the risk of becoming involved in litigation; 18 percent of the respondents
listed fear of becoming involved in the administrative or legal process as an important reason
for not reporting adverse reactions. Several other surveys have been conducted which asked
physicians what factors inuenced their decision not to report an adverse event. Between 8
and 14 percent of the respondents in the studies stated that concern over legal liability was
one reason why they did not report an adverse event.148
If it is true that liability really is more of a concern to medical professionals than is apparent from the
attitudinal studies in Table 1, one might wonder why that data does not reect this. It is worth noting
that none of the studies compiled were performed in the United States, and those countries' liability systems
may be dierent than that of the United States. Moreover, the United States is a particularly litigious
country, which may make the threat of litigation far more tangible. However, to my knowledge, none of the
countries in the studies insulate their reporting physicians from malpractice liability, so the numbers still
seem surprisingly low despite cultural and legal dierences.
Not all the data in the compiled studies points as sharply to the conclusion that liability is not an issue
in underreporting. One interesting nding of the Dutch study, from a question not posed in the other
studies, was that 31.7% of the respondents would not report an ADR if another physician had prescribed the
medication.149The study did not attempt to explain this statistic. Of the possible explanations for this, a few
seem to be particularly likely. Limited information about the patient's medical and medicinal state at the
time of prescription could create more uncertainty about the cause of the reaction, leading the new doctor
to refrain from reporting it. However, in many cases it is not clear that this complication is present. Often,
if the patient had only recently begun using the medication, as is likely given that long-term reactions are
rarely identied as ADRs, the medical history of the time of prescription will not be so outdated. This 31.7%
statistic may reect a disinclination to point \blame" on a dierent doctor, regardless of legal liability issues.
149Eland, supra note 60, at 624-25.
47Yet it seems incongruous that over thirty percent of doctors will not report ADRs if they did not prescribe
the medication, but only 2-3% of the same group claim that legal liability is a factor in underreporting.
Undoubtedly the desire not to point ngers is substantial, but is it so great that it causes such a discrepancy,
or, perhaps, is the 2-3% gure lower than reality? In other words, when it comes to legal liability, do
people more quickly deny that it is a personal concern but worry about creating it for others? If so, why?
Further liability disquiet comes from the authors of the EU study, who, while admitting that the data did
not indicate that legal liability created a large reluctance to report, warned that \in an increasingly litigious
age, national agencies might need to be prepared to be able to provide some reassurance to reporters that
the information that they provide will not be used against them, personally, in any legal action."150 Finally,
although a surprising 85-88% of the responding doctors in the UK study stated that they were happy to
disclose their identity in submitting reaction reports,151 it does not necessarily follow that the disclosure of
identity is not a disincentive to reporting some ADRs. If doctors only report those ADRs that do not make
them uncomfortable for causation reasons, then disclosure will not be a concern.152
It may also be that physicians are simply not aware of the eect the avoidance of liability has on their
behavior. Admitting that a factor like lack of time sties reporting reects a somewhat calculated judgment
on the part of the medical professional that ADR reporting is not as much of a priority as other things.
However, to the extent that doctors recognize the benets of the spontaneous reporting systems, and a large
number seem to, it may be very dicult for them to admit, even to themselves, that they would be willing
150Belton, 52 Eur. J. Clinical Pharmacology at 427, supra note 49.
151Bateman, supra note 64, at 426.
152There is one piece of data that sheds light on the extent to which liability concerns are central in physician's thoughts. The
Dutch study data showed that 27.2% of the doctors would not report ADRs from over the counter medications. Eland, supra
note 60, at 625. However, these cases may be among the few where legal liability is the least implicated, if, for example, the
patient purchased the drug over the counter without the doctor's recommendation. While this neither negates nor supports
the argument that liability concerns are signicant deterrents to reporting, it does indicate that they are not the only major
concerns.
48to forego those benets in order to avoid liability. Though individual doctors may be reluctant to recognize
how much potential liability shapes primary behavior, perhaps its greater eect is to create an atmosphere
where reporting is not encouraged. Although individual doctors may not be aware of liability issues, many
administrators are, and they have some inuence in setting doctors' priorities. Consequently, they seem to
have some ability to encourage reporting. It would be interesting to know how much encouraging they do
and whether they feel it is in the hospital or facility's best interests to report. It may be telling that in
both of the United Kingdom studies, the general practitioners knew more about reporting than the hospital
doctors. Perhaps there is an attitudinal dierence within their work environments that changes the value
they place on reporting. Perhaps hospital doctors being less informed about reporting is a product of general
institutional policies that try to avoid liability. In the United States, the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Healthcare Organizations requires that all hospitals \develop a system to summarize adverse drug
reactions, to observe for trends that occur in in-hospital patients or outpatients in aliated clinics, and to
conduct ongoing drug utilization monitors."153 This requirement seems like an eort to instill a pro-reporting
environment since \ongoing accreditation of a health-care organization can be threatened if it does not have
an active reporting program."154
2.
The law in the United States
153Linda M. Lucas, MD & Colleen A. Colley, PharmD, Recognizing and Reporting Adverse Drug Reactions, 156 W. J. Med.
172, 174 (1991).
154David R. Witmer, PharmD, Fern Z. Liang, M.P.H., J.D., Reporting of adverse drug reactions and physician liability, 49
Am. J. Health-Sys. Pharmacy 538, 544 (1992).
49In July of 1995, the Food and Drug Administration passed a new regulation, 21 C.F.R. x20.63(f) about
the condentiality of adverse event reports.155The regulatory structure as it is currently set up essentially
allows the public disclosure of adverse event reports submitted directly to the FDA but requires deletion of
the names and identifying information of the patient and any third parties mentioned in the report.156 The
names of voluntary reporters or anyone associated with an adverse event shall not be disclosed by the FDA
or a manufacturer in response to \a request, demand, or order."157 However, three exceptions apply. First,
if both the voluntary reporter and the person who experienced the adverse event consent then the identities
may be disclosed.158 The second exception states that \[i]dentities of the voluntary reporter and the person
who experienced the reported adverse event may be disclosed pursuant to a court order in the course of
medical malpractice litigation involving both parties."159 This eectively means that in a malpractice case,
an adverse event report is discoverable by a court order if the litigation involves the voluntary reporter
and the person who experienced the adverse event. Interestingly, this suggests that it may be possible to
bypass this disclosure in a malpractice case targeting the prescriber of the medicine if someone other than
the prescriber les the adverse event report. Finally, the third exception is that the report, excluding the
identities of any other individuals, shall be disclosed to the person who is the subject of the report.160 The
regulation also preempts any state or local law that \permits or requires disclosure of the identities of the
voluntary reporter or other person identied in an adverse event report."161 Additionally, this regulation
does not prevent disclosure of reports (and all of the personal information within them) by others who may
be in possession of copies of them, including the voluntary reporters, other medical personnel or hospitals.162
15521 C.F.R. x20.63(f).
156See 21 C.F.R. x20.111(c)(3); Bonnie L. Mayeld, Preventing Manufacturer Compelled Disclosure of Condential Informa-
tion Contained in Voluntarily Submitted Adverse Event Reports, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 265, 265 (1995).
15721 C.F.R. x20.63(f).
158See 21 C.F.R. x20.63(f)(1)(i).
15921 C.F.R. x20.63(f)(1)(ii).
160See 21 C.F.R. x20.63(f)(1)(iii).
16121 C.F.R. x20.63(f)(2).
162See Mayeld, supra note 156, at 271-72.
50While the FDA seems to agree that subjecting doctors to potential liability will jeopardize reporting,163 the
regulations do not go very far to prevent this from happening. In proposing the new regulations, the FDA
stated,
The proposed regulation has been drafted to permit any individual plainti who experienced
an adverse event and subsequently has become involved in medical malpractice litigation
with the person who reported the event to obtain all the information contained in the
adverse event report. In this situation, where both parties to the litigation know each
other's identities, the interests of the parties in protecting this information is minimized
and, therefore, would not impose a signicant disincentive to reporting.164
The extent to which adverse drug event reports are condential in other contexts remains unclear. Some
states have statutory condentiality protections that may be more protective than the FDA statute since
they \protect from discovery information that is collected for quality assurance and peer review purposes."165
Although the FDA regulation has a preemption provision, the language seems to preempt only those state
statutes that would require disclosure, not more protective ones.
Undoubtedly there remains a perception that reporting increases physician malpractice liability because it
constitutes an admission by the doctor that an adverse reaction occurred that was probably unanticipated.
This is a misperception because that information, in and of itself, does not mean that the physician was
negligent, which is critical in proving malpractice.166 The only time a legal action can be brought against
a physician with respect to the use of a drug is when an injured patient questions the doctor's medical
judgment in light of standards of care generally exercised by the medical community.
An article in the Southern Medical Journal in 1994 explained the liability structure.167 Doctors are
found negligent if they contribute to an injury by falling below the standards of practice in the community.168
163\FDA believes that if the identities of reporters or patients were made public or available to third parties, health care
professionals would be much more reluctant to submit voluntary adverse event reports for fear of involving themselves and their
patients in litigation." 59 Fed. Reg. at 3947, supra note 8.
165Witmer, supra note 154 at 544.
166See Mayeld, supra note 156, at 265 (arguing that adverse reports are not relevant to a determination of causation).
167Michele B. Kaufman, PharmD, et al., Physicians' Liability for Adverse Drug Reactions, 87 S. Med. J. 780, 781 (1994).
168See id.; A. Russell Localio, JD, MPH, MS, et al., Identifying Adverse Events Caused by Medical Care: Degree of Physician
Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review, 125 Annals Internal Med. 457, 457 (1996).
51This happens in two ways: by failing to do something, or by doing something incorrectly. Many factors are
involved in assessing the requisite standard of care. The inquiry is into whether:
$
the doctor should have been aware of the risks involved in prescribing the
medication
$
the manufacturer's literature had warnings which were not followed
$ a physician exercising reasonable care would have read the literature
$ the expected benets of the drug justied exposing the patient to its risks
$ the doctor failed to perform specic tests recommended in the literature
$
the patient had a history of any specic drug-disease interactions or
relevant experiences about which the physician should have known
$ the doctor should have noticed the adverse eect of the drug when it occurred and taken countermea-
sures
$
the medication could have been stopped in time to avoid injury, and
$ the countermeasures taken were adequate.169
In general, when physicians prescribe a drug for a non-approved indication (an o-label use), they do so at
169See Kaufman, supra note 167, at 781-82.
52their own risk. This essentially means that they must be prepared show the use as being within the standard
of care. Unless prior similar adverse drug reactions are published in the medical literature, they cannot be
used as the basis for liability since physicians are not assumed to know this information that is not generally
available to the public.170
Ironically, a perspective that fears reporting due to liability concerns is in itself counterproductive. The
FDA can implement informative and preventative measures to combat suspected ADRs. These measures
decrease the recurrence of ADRs and therefore result in fewer malpractice lawsuits about ADRs. Conse-
quently, reporting adverse reactions has the potential of reducing physician liability by allowing the FDA to
act preventatively. Furthermore, reports document the uncertainty of the causes of some adverse reactions
and the fact that they are unpreventable.171
The key question in assessing liability fears is what information is gained from the disclosure of ADR reports
that could be useful in a plainti's malpractice case. If a patient has initiated a negligence case, she will
already have access to her medical records, which describe how the doctor responded, if at all, to the drug
event and include most of the MedWatch report information. The only potentially important information
that could be gleaned from ADR reports is information pertaining to the doctor's state of mind. If the
doctor failed to include in his report a preexisting medical condition or concurrent medication that may
have been responsible for the event, it may be \evidence" that he had not thought of a connection prior to
prescribing the medication, or that he had not read the literature on which conditions or medications cause
complications with the prescribed drug. The question of whether a reaction was foreseeable and how that
relates to reporting is rather complicated. If the reaction was unheard of, then the doctor could not have
foreseen it and its occurrence does not indicate practice below the standard of care regardless of what was
170See id. at 782.
171See Witmer, supra note 154, at 544.
53included in the report. If the reaction was described in the literature as occurring occasionally, but did not
include any conclusions about how to avoid it, its occurrence still would not seem to reect negatively on the
doctor's standard of care, unless there existed a less \risky" alternative. But, if the reaction was described
in the literature with preventative measures, and the doctor failed to follow those, then reporting the reac-
tion along with an implicit admission of not having followed those recommendations may be meaningful in
arguing that the doctor acted beneath the standard of care. The very existence of the adverse drug event
report and the identity of the reporter are also important to some plaintis. But, if the report's contents
are not legally relevant, it is unclear why its existence should have much signicance.
Therefore, in sum, since the only new information found in adverse event reports is about the doctor's sup-
posed mental state concerning the relevant medical history and concomitant medical products, the risk to
the doctor is in the overall implication that submitting a report establishes that a reaction was unforeseen
and serious, when perhaps he should have anticipated it. It may be that the relevance of this information,
to the extent that it is at all relevant, would be dramatically lessened if someone other than the treating
physician completes and les the report form. In such a case, it would be less probative of the physician's
thoughts when he prescribed the medication.
3.
Avoiding disclosure of reports
Among the methods of dealing with this liability issue, the force of which may be increasing as damage awards
54increase, are attempts at decreasing the impact of ADR reports in court. In her paper entitled Prevent-
ing manufacturer compelled disclosure of condential information contained in voluntarily submitted adverse
event reports, Bonnie L. Mayeld explains how defense attorneys can attempt to exclude the admission of
these reports from evidence, once they have been discovered.172 These exclusions apply both to the patient's
individual adverse event report and to compilations of other similar adverse event reports. Initially, one can
argue that adverse event reports are irrelevant since they do not prove causation, particularly because of
the inherent uncertainty in the relationship between the drug and the reaction.173 Furthermore, they lack
probative value since they are not veried for accuracy. The inclusion of multiple adverse event reports is
also not useful in proving causation because, as explained previously, a compilation of reports cannot be used
to determine the frequency of reactions and should not be used for epidemiological purposes. Also, adverse
event reports are not comparable for causation purposes unless they are substantially similar and arose from
the \same cause" which is extremely dicult to determine and prove.174 Mayeld also argues that even if
these reports were remotely probative, allowing voluminous packages of adverse event reports into evidence
would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403 since it would prejudice, confuse and mislead the jury.175 Fi-
nally, Mayeld explains that these reports should be excluded as inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule
of Evidence 802 since they are being oered for the truth of the matter asserted but contain statements by
others, and they do not fall into any of the exceptions.176 Furthermore, often the reports contain multiple
layers of hearsay.177 While most of these arguments apply equally to the plainti's individual ADE report
and general ADE reports that the plainti might seek to admit into evidence, the hearsay argument is
probably much less potent when discussing the adverse event report in the actual case because the reported
172Mayeld, supra note 156, at 277-84.
173Id. at 278.
174Id. at 279-80.
175Id. at 281.
176Id. at 283.
177Id.
55information is arguably state of mind evidence and would not be oered for its truth. In addition, these
arguments pertain to the admission of ADE reports even if in a particular case the plainti's doctor did not
le one. Therefore, if successful, these arguments would mean that a reporting physician would not have to
worry about increasing the possibility of his own personal liability or that of physicians generally by ling a
report.
The arguments for exclusion on the basis of irrelevance, undue prejudice and hearsay may be valuable for
defendants in malpractice litigation, but until there is some pattern of their success, the risk of ADE reports
coming in as evidence against doctors may still stie reporting. A rule that these reports are either inad-
missible or undiscoverable, as discussed in the next section, may be necessary to overcome this hurdle.
4.
Potential improvements of the law
Most would agree, as Mayeld argued, that ADEs have little value in malpractice cases. A legitimate
malpractice case should be able to establish causation through expert testimony. Much of the relevant in-
formation, about whether the doctor incorrectly prescribed a drug in contravention of a stated warning will
already be in the patient's medical le. Moreover, such a report's inclusion into evidence would be very
prejudicial because it may be hard for the defendant to explain to the jury why it is not an admission of
guilt. In addition, as previously explained, the probative value is not very high. Finally, if underreporting
really is signicantly related to fears of litigation, the value of increased reporting may outweigh the costs
of excluding this evidence. The purported harms caused by the medical profession's aversion to liability is
56probably not worth the minimal, if at all, benet from discovering and admitting ADE reports.
a.
Making ADEs inadmissible or undiscoverable
One option for dealing with the liability cause of underreporting would be a statute, regulation, or case
providing that adverse event reports and their existence in a given situation are inadmissible in a malpractice
action. Reports, then, could not be introduced into evidence and the very fact that an event was reported
to the FDA or a manufacturer could not be presented at a trial. In the comments to rule x20.63, the FDA
rejected a recommendation to prohibit adverse event reports from being admissible into evidence unless the
reporter knew it contained false information. The reason for rejection was not exactly clear.178
Congress actually passed heightened disclosure protections prohibiting admissibility of adverse event reports
for medical devices. Section 519(b)(3) of 21 U.S.C. 360i(b)(3) provides that \[n]o report made under [the
device user facility requirements] by a physician who is not required to make such a report, shall be admissible
into evidence or otherwise used in any action involving private parties unless the facility, individual, or
physician who made the report had knowledge of the falsity of the information contained in the report."179
In discussing this provision in the Federal Register, the Food and Drug Administration stated, \Congress
enacted this provision to encourage private physicians to notify FDA or the manufacturer of device problems
(H. Rept. 808, 101st Cong., 2d sess. 21 (1990)). This provision, however, may not be sucient to prevent
178Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients; Preemption of Disclosure Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 16962,
16964 (1995).
179See 59 Fed. Reg. at 3946, supra note 8.
57manufacturers from being compelled to release the reporters' or patients' identities pursuant to a discovery
order."180 It is remarkable that the FDA chose not to apply the same line of reasoning in their decision not
to prevent the admission of adverse drug event reports at trials.
Another option could be to extend the condentiality protections to prohibit discovery of ADEs altogether,
not just their admission into evidence. This may reduce frivolous suits by plaintis who believe that adverse
drug event reports imply malpractice. Such a prohibition would increase physician condence in reporting
if they did not think that the \fruits" of their report could be used against them in any way, for instance, as
a key into further discovery angles. However, this may be too dramatic a move against plaintis, who, after
all, seem to have some inherent right to know what has been reported about them. Additionally, this would
probably be a much more politically bold move than just preventing admissibility, and one that would seem
extremely anti-plainti. Ironically, if the purpose is really to enhance reporting, it is exactly the potential
plaintis, the patients, who are the beneciaries.
b.
Immunizing reporters from malpractice liability
It would be possible to immunize physicians who report adverse drug events from medical liability, although
a cost benet analysis may exclude this as an option. Under such a regime, those reactions that could be
foreseen with reasonable care would be immunized along with the unforeseeable cases, which would not be
180Id.
58successful in court regardless. The real question is whether it would be worth immunizing those cases of
below standard of care treatment in order to dissolve misperceptions about liability, on the assumption that
everyone would report everything in order to avoid liability.181 Not only would this waste time, but the long-
term eects of this immunity may be very serious. It certainly reduces the doctor's need to stay informed
about eects of medications, somewhat defeating the purpose of the quick acquisition of ADR information.
This is not to suggest bad faith or laziness on the part of anyone, simply a natural shift in priorities. Given
alternative means for dissolving liability fears, immunization for reporters should not be implemented.
5.
A note on selectivity and liability
Ironically, liability concerns may, in fact, increase the \selectivity" of reporting. Medical professionals may be
more likely to report reactions not contained in product labeling than those covered in the labeling because
the former are more \unforeseeable"182 and therefore more selective by MedWatch standards. Doctors may
feel that reporting reactions mentioned in the drug labeling, by indicating that it may have been serious and
unexpected, may expose them to liability for not having read the warnings.
181Although one could imagine that physicians might want to avoid a written record of negligence.
182See Shader, supra note 38, at 303.
59F.
The desire to publish interferes with reporting
1.
The evidence
In 1996 a letter to the British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, W.H.W. Inman, who oversaw
the creation of the British Yellow Card spontaneous reporting system thirty years earlier, emphasized a
preference in the medical community to publish adverse reactions rather than to report them.183 He said
that a majority of adverse reactions reported in the medical journals are not reported to the CSM. This
\includes many of the best-documented and most reliable reports."184 This creates a delay between discov-
ering the problem and dealing with it. The agency can have the product pulled o the market before the
study is published. A response to his letter argued that most physicians are not inuenced by this reason
when deciding not to report.185 The compiled studies also somewhat de-emphasize this concern. In the
Italian study only 2.9% of the survey respondents admitted to having reported adverse drug reactions to a
scientic journal.186It is unclear whether this was in addition to reporting elsewhere, but it is noteworthy
183Inman, supra note 33, at 434.
184Id. Professor Inman wrote,
The yellow card system failed to signal the most serious problem since thalidomide { the oculomucocutaneous syndrome
caused by practolol. It was eventually revealed as a result of the publication of several series of cases that must have taken some
considerable time to accumulate. Although some authors sent drafts of their papers to the CSM shortly before publication,
the individual cases that were included in these papers were not reported as early as they could have been. Similar delays in
recognition of problems by the CSM have occurred on several other occasions with other drugs.
Id.
185Karen J. Belton et al., Reply: Attitudes to adverse drug reaction reporting, 41 Brit. J. Clinical Pharmacology, 435,
435 (1996).
186Cosentino, supra note 55, at 86.
60even so. Unfortunately no survey directly solicited data on how many respondents had previously reported
a particular adverse reaction to a journal but not to a spontaneous reporting system. The European Union
study requested that respondents agree or disagree as to whether various factors inuence reporting. Pub-
lishing prospects were considered important in discouraging reporting by at most 4% of the respondents
(Italy), and virtually none in Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Nonetheless, publishing potential does create a
bad incentive to delay reporting, particularly with unique or serious reactions. Those cases that are grounds
for a publishable study are likely to provide exactly the relevant information that should be known about
as soon as possible. The high selectivity of those cases means that even low levels of disincentive to report
them should be minimized.
2.
Journal policies
Perhaps a policy requiring that in order to publish adverse reaction related articles the author must have
previously reported those cases to the national spontaneous reporting system would be benecial. A policy
like this would probably have to be implemented by medical journals. It would seem contrary to rst
amendment principles for this to be a statutory or regulatory requirement. A pertinent question is how
would this eect the publishability of these case studies. In arguing his position, Professor Inman stated, \I
doubt if young doctors who need publications to advance their career would wish to share their experiences
with a government agency. I believe this is an important reason for the relative scarcity of reports from
hospitals to which most of the more serious adverse reactions must be referred."187 Yet it would seem
187Inman, supra note 33, at 434.
61that the eect of disclosing this information to a government agency would not be so defeating to publishing
aspirations. The Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals' section on Issues
to Consider Before Submitting a Manuscript states,
Preliminary reporting to public media, governmental agencies, or manufacturers, of scientic
information described in a paper or a letter to the editor that has been accepted but not
yet published violates the policies of many journals. Such reporting may be warranted when
the paper or letter describes major therapeutic advances or public health hazards such as
serious adverse eects of drugs, vaccines, other biological products, or medicinal devices, or
reportable diseases. This reporting should not jeopardize publication, but should be discussed
with and agreed upon by the editor in advance.188
The New England Journal of Medicine's Editorial Policy states that
[W]e defer to the judgment of public health authorities, such as the National Institutes
of Health or Centers for Disease Control, about whether prepublication release of research
conclusions is warranted because of immediate implications for the public health. If these
agencies make such a decision, presumably after appropriate review, we will consider a
manuscript even though the results have already been released { say, in a press conference,
a special alert, or the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report...189
Also, reporting adverse events will not always result in an immediate announcement from the FDA on the
drug's safety. Even if in the time between reporting and acceptance of the article for publication the FDA
issues a new warning for a medication, this does not eviscerate the value of a scientic article on precisely
why there is a problem and how to deal with it. To the extent that any FDA action will substantially
diminish the value of an article it would have to be both quick and signicant, the combination of which
suggests that the ADR is one where public health would be most aected by waiting to disclose it. At some
point the primary duty of doctors and medical journals is to the patients. Perhaps medical journals should
set the standard with a reporting requirement and remind doctors of this obligation where it can be most
benecial.
62G.
Patient involvement in reporting
1.
Medical health practitioners do not hear about many adverse reactions due to a doctor-patient
information gap
There is undoubtedly a gap between patients and physicians that further limits the reporting of adverse
reactions. One article highlighted the fact that all promotional material about spontaneous reporting systems
targets medical practitioners and the pharmaceutical industry.190 However, doctors only learn about adverse
reaction occurrences from their patients,191 so often doctors will not nd out about the problems. For
instance, when the patient sees dierent doctors for the prescription and reaction, the patient may be the
only one who makes the connection.
There are many reasons for why patients may not report adverse events. They often do not report because
they are afraid to question their physicians or suggest that the doctor had erred.192 The FDA has empha-
sized that patients should report directly to the FDA in cases where they are embarrassed or have other
reasons for not wanting to report a problem through a health professional.193 However, it is likely that most
190Edlavitch, supra note 85, at 1501.
It is interesting that in only one article that I read did it mention that the FDA encourages anyone aware of a serious adverse
reaction, including consumers, to le a MedWatch report. See John Henkel, MedWatch: FDA's `Heads up' on medical product
safety, 32 FDA Consumer 10, 12 (1998).
191See Edlavitch, supra note 85, at 1501.
192See id.
193See Henkel, supra note 190, at 12.
63consumers are not aware that a reporting program even exists. Therefore, reporting probably occurs most
often when patients seek medical attention for their reactions and the patient or treating physician attributes
the problem to the drug. One might argue that this comports with FDA's goal of only reporting serious
events. Still it would be preferable for a medical practitioner to hear about each adverse event and decide
whether it is \reportable" than to never learn about it. Even if the FDA only wants serious events reported,
the information may also be important to the doctor for therapeutic reasons.
2.
The FDA does not often hear from patients although direct patient reporting can be benecial
The American MedWatch system currently accepts patient-submitted reports, but that is not highly pub-
licized. Patients are invited to report adverse events using the same forms as health care professionals. A
study comparing pre- and post-MedWatch reporting showed that although the percentage of reports from
pharmacists increased and the percentage of reports from physicians decreased, the percentage from non-
health care professionals stayed static at 6%.194 It is interesting that the percentage of consumer reports did
not change. Given that the MedWatch advertising campaign did not target consumers,195 and MedWatch
increased the total number of reports, the fact that the percentage of patient reports stayed static indicates
that the number of their reports also increased after MedWatch. Presumably those patients who are medi-
cally informed were inuenced by MedWatch's advertising eorts. Still, patients generally are an untapped
resource for adverse event information.
194Piazza-Hepp, supra note 47, at 1437-38.
195See Edlavitch, supra note 85, at 1501 (pointing out that promotional material about spontaneous reporting systems targets
the medical and pharmaceutical communities almost exclusively).
64There is reason to believe that involving patients in reporting yields a dierent set of adverse event data. A
Dutch study performed in 1999 compared information gained from spontaneous reporting and information
gained from daily ward visits of patients.196 During the ward visits an investigator asked the patients about
whether they had possibly experienced any adverse drug events.197 The ward data was compared to adverse
drug event data on the same population collected by spontaneous reporting from doctors and nurses. The
study revealed that the doctors reported a signicantly larger number of serious and unknown ADEs than
the patients did during the ward visits.198 Nurses and patients had statistically similar reporting data.199
Interestingly, however, only patients, not doctors or nurses, reported adverse drug events from new drugs.200
The study concluded that as a result of the split between doctors being the main reporters of serious and
unknown ADEs in hospitalized patients, and patient interviews yielding more ADEs of new drugs, it may
be cost eective to do daily ward visits for patients using new medications.201 Although the cost of daily
ward visits would probably be extremely high, this evidence suggests that it may be particularly useful to
encourage patients to report suspected reactions to their doctors or the FDA, since their information may
be substantively dierent from the information that doctors alone usually provide.
196P.M.L.A. van den Bemt, et al, Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients, 55 Eur. J. Clinical Pharmacology 155
(1999).
197Id. at 156.
198Id. at 155.
199Id.
200Id.
201Id.
653.
Mechanisms for encouraging patient reporting to doctors or to the FDA directly
This doctor-patient gap alone may be a reason to target patients with advertising, as is done for medical
professionals, to encourage them to report troubling drug reactions either to their physicians or pharmacists,
or directly to the spontaneous reporting system.202 In order to have an ecient system, we need to educate
patients in identifying and reporting adverse reactions that may be drug related. The FDA is taking steps to
increase access to patients and involve them in the process by partnering with pharmacy chains, which are
another avenue to patients and their reactions.203 Among the improvements to the pre-MedWatch reporting
system recommended by Stanley A. Edlavitch, Ph.D, in Adverse Drug Event Reporting, Improving the Low
US Reporting Rates, was sending a clear message for medical and lay communities on what and how to
report.204 Additionally he wrote that \[p]racticing physicians, pharmacists, other medical practitioners, and
the general public should be familiar with the system, encouraged to appropriately report suspect events,
and be assured the system is operating optimally to protect health."205 While MedWatch has improved
medical professionals' knowledge of spontaneous reporting, this was only one link in the chain. The lay
community still lacks this critical knowledge.
a.
Encouraging reporting to medical professionals
Encouraging patients to report reactions to their doctors may signicantly improve awareness of reporting
202See Edlavitch, supra note 85, at 1501.
203See Henkel, supra note 190, at 15.
204Edlavitch, supra note 85, at 1501.
205Id. at 1502.
66programs, enhance their eectiveness, and benet patient treatments. A British study published in 1988
monitored the feasibility and benets of patient encouragement.206 Patients who were prescribed a black
triangle drug were given a leaet by the pharmacist encouraging them to report any adverse reaction to
their doctor. Reports to doctors of adverse reactions rose from 10 out of 1000 to 23 out of 1000. \The
odds of an adverse reaction being reported to the doctor were increased by a factor of 2.2 for patients given
a leaet."207 It is noteworthy that the study concluded that this increase was not statistically signicant
at the 5% level.208 Despite all this encouragement, however, only one \yellow card" was submitted to the
CSM. Also, one patient out of the total 1057 was so alarmed by the leaet advice that the patient refused to
take the medication. This was the only reported negative comment by a patient.209 Otherwise, the method
was well received by the patients, doctors and pharmacists involved in the study.210 The authors ultimately
concluded that the results suggested that patients can be stimulated to report adverse reactions to their
doctor, but that any potential benet is lost if these reports are not relayed to the Committee on Safety of
Medicines by the doctor.211
b.
Encouraging reporting to the FDA directly
Simply listing the MedWatch (or other spontaneous reporting system) web address on medication bottles
would probably signicantly increase the number of direct patient reports. If nothing else, it would inform
206J.P.M. Campbell, MD, MRCGP & J.G.R. Howie, MD, FRCGP, Involving the Patient in Reporting Adverse Drug Reactions,
38 J. Royal C. Gen. Prac. 370 (1988).
207Id. at 370.
208Id.
209Id. at 370.
210Id. at 371.
211Id.
67patients of spontaneous reporting systems in general, which may increase communication with their physi-
cians; at the very least, the curiosity of many would be whetted, and they would visit the site. It is also
possible that a certain patient groups would particularly benet from this information. Teenagers, for exam-
ple, whose adverse reactions are very hard to monitor because of their desire for independence with respect
to their medications,212 are also among the most web-connected age groups. They may be likely to take
advantage of Internet reporting options if they are aware of them, particularly because of the comparable
impersonality as compared to discussing problems with their doctors.
There are some serious limitations with a publicized direct patient reporting system. One concern about
patient reporting is the quality of reports. A larger quantity of reporting is useful only if the reports are
of good quality and include all the relevant information.213 This may explain a reluctance to partake in
concerted eorts to increase patient reporting.214 There is no easy way to deal with this problem, but one
possibility is to have a telephone line for hospital patients to report to hospital pharmacies.215 The possibil-
ity of human interaction would allow trained professionals to seek the relevant information. Alternatively,
encouraging patients to report ADEs to the FDA by telephone would have similar benets. However, having
representatives available to solicit more detailed information from patients would entail increased adminis-
trative costs. A second concern with patient reporting is that there may be no way to prevent an individual
from sending or calling in false or multiple reports so as to skew the data. This may not be easily prevented
without involving an intermediate person who can attempt to serve as a lter. Since doctors can serve as
the intermediaries, it may be preferable to encourage reporting to them instead of directly to the FDA,
especially since doctors already have therapeutic reasons for desiring this information.
212See Nightingale & Homan, Adolescent Health at 279, supra note 10.
213Cf. van den Bemt, supra note 196, at 156.
214See generally Andrew S. Mitchell, et al, Patients as a direct source of information on adverse drug reactions, 297 Brit.
Med. J. 891 (1988).
215See van den Bemt, supra note 196, at 158.
68c.
Conclusions on patient involvement eorts
Since direct pharmaceutical advertising has taken over our televisions, one of the biggest concerns has been
the aect this has had on medical treatments. Doctors are being pushed by their patients to prescribe the
latest medications. If it is true that patients take such an interest in their treatments so as to \force" doctors
to listen to their requests, it is hard to believe that they would not be amenable to at least some involvement
in adverse reaction reporting. Of course, a reaction report will not necessarily decrease their pain, which may
create the incentive to request specic medications in the rst place. Still, would patients informed about
MedWatch be more inclined to tell their doctors about adverse reactions that they had? Would they be more
inclined to ask or even push their doctors to report adverse reactions? In a world where everyone wants
to share their personal traumas with society and have society respond,216 involving patients may be the
best approach to encouraging physician reporting. Advertising MedWatch directly to consumers may seem
bizarre (although maybe not ineective) if it took the form of a television add. But to correspond with the
product labeling point, what if product labels included the statement: \Stop use and consult a doctor
if...XXX...or other allergic reaction develops. Encourage your doctor to report this
incident to the Food and Drug Administration in order to help prevent similar reactions
in the future. See http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/index.html for more information."? It may
seem idealistic that anyone would either read this warning or follow its instructions, but it is not clear that
citizens are so apathetic to the causes of humanity that such a plea would be wasted. If we are quick to
tell each other which restaurant gave us food poisoning, we may feel equally compelled in this instance.
216See, e.g., The Oprah Winfrey Show, The Jerry Springer Show & The Real World.
69Product labels printed with the MedWatch reporting website as well as a word encouraging patients to
report problems to their physicians may be an ideal mix of information and encouragement.
Conclusion
While the Food and Drug Administration's spontaneous reporting system has signicantly improved re-
porting rates in the United States, there may be some ways of further enhancing adverse drug reaction
information in the United States and worldwide. Depending on their costs, these extra eorts may be worth-
while if they can signicantly reduce the amount of time between a product's availability on the market and
the discovery of its harmful eects. Studies worldwide have provided useful information as to why sponta-
neous reporting systems do not receive more cases from the medical community. This piece has included
the proposal and discussion of several possible improvements to enhance current reporting quality and rates.
Although some important improvements may involve modications to the reporting system or informing the
patient community, part of the answer to resolving reporting problems is not within the direct control of
the FDA because part of the problem involves the current health care structure and inconsistencies in the
goals of adverse reaction reporting and the legal system. Therefore, while some improvements require more
conned eorts, others may have to deal comprehensively with larger institutions.
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Table 1: Compilation of Answers from Certain Questions in Attitudinal Studies
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28 85 85 95 93 93 91
Unavailability
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8 N/A 52 55 25 64 23 21 21 16 16yy 12yy 27yy 11yy
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14 9yy 14yy NP NP
Assume
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safe
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Question European
Union
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UK
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Africa
Den. Fr. Ire. Ita. Hol. Por. Sp. Swe. UK All GP HospAll GP MS SS GP ConsJrs. All GP MS SS
75Reporting
is
too
bu-
reau-
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or
takes
too
much
time
5 43 46 37 38 31 40 30* 32* 23*
Drug
wasn't
new
51 76 19 16
Too
busy
to
re-
port
35 31 48 42 31 38 27yy
50
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51
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53
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All numbers are percentages unless otherwise specied, and they have been rounded to the nearest whole
number.
The countries in the European Union study were: Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Spain,
76Sweden and the United Kingdom
Symbols and Abbreviations:
EU: European Union
IR: Ireland
IT: Italy
NE: The Netherlands
NP: Not provided
SA: South Africa
SRS: Spontaneous reporting system
UK: Northern United Kingdom
* Converted from the data provided in the study
** There seems to be a distinction between these two questions. The category \uncertain the drug
caused the reaction" seems to entirely encompass the category \multiple drugs made it unclear" but
also includes other uncertainties.
y This data came from ll-in questions and not multiple choice or yes/no questions. The numbers
provided without the symbol came from multiple choice or yes/no questions. Sometimes both
ll-in and select an answer questions were posed soliciting similar information in the same study.
It may not be accurate to compare the responses to the two dierent kinds of questions because
of a memory-triggering eect created by the multiple choice and yes/no questions. Although a
participant may have agreed to a question, she may not have thought to include that point in her
ll-in answer.
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